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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
HOW THE PROSPECT OF FAULT  
INFLUENCES MANAGERS’ COMPLIANCE 
The SEC relies heavily on ‘no-fault’ settlements in its enforcement, where targets avoid costly 
litigation by accepting sanctions without admitting or denying fault.  This policy is argued to 
enable the agency to pursue greater numbers of violators.  However, opponents argue that no-
fault sanctions may be less effective, reducing fines to a ‘cost of business’.  In an experiment, I 
examine the effects of fault assignment on managers’ cost perceptions, ethical framing and 
compliance.  I manipulate the presence of fault assignment in prospective sanctions, and 
additionally manipulate sanction strength and sanction target - attributes that commonly vary in 
sanctions and which may interact with fault assignment.  I find that all manipulated sanction 
attributes increase managers’ cost perceptions, and that managers’ cost perceptions are associated 
with greater compliance frequency and compliance quality.  I also find that managers facing fault 
assignment in manager-targeted sanction conditions perceive their compliance differently – as an 
ethical, rather than economic choice.  Consequently, these managers comply more frequently 
with costly regulations and select higher quality compliance than do managers in manager-
targeted no-fault conditions.  Targeting firms with sanctions also increases managers’ ethical 
perceptions, but adding fault to firm-targeted sanctions does not further increase ethical 
perceptions or compliance.  My findings are consistent with sanctions facilitating greater ethical 
awareness and compliance when fault targets managers or when sanctions target firms, and with 
ethical awareness facilitating greater compliance.  Supplementary analysis suggests that results 
are stronger among individuals high in ‘dark triad’ personality traits (narcissism, 
machiavellianism, and psychopathy), suggesting that findings generalize to subpopulations 
thought to be high in dark triad traits such as firm managers (O’Reilly et al. 2014). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this study I examine if and how the prospect of fault influences managers’ 
compliance with protective regulations. The SEC resolves virtually all of its enforcement 
actions through ‘no-fault’ settlements (90% from 2012 - 2014), where enforcement 
targets forgo costly litigation by agreeing to penalties without admitting or denying fault 
in the matter (Eaglesham & Ackerman 2013, White 2013). SEC leaders argue that these 
settlements expedite enforcement, enabling more enforcement actions (White 2013, 
Khuzami 2012). However, critics argue that sanctions without fault may be ineffective, 
transforming sanctions into ‘just another cost of business’ (Ackerman & Rexrode 2014, 
Eaglesham & Ackerman 2013). I hypothesize that managers perceive compliance 
differently when faced with fault – as an ethical rather than economic choice. Absent 
fault, I expect managers to treat fines as a price, comparing the economic gains of non-
compliance to the economic penalties of sanctions (Gneezy & Rustichini 2000). 
Consequently, managers’ compliance should be more frequent and higher quality when 
sanctions include fault than when they include only economic penalties (i.e., ‘no-fault’).  
Regulators compel compliance through sanctions, which are typically discussed in 
terms of their financial penalties. However, financial penalties and compliance share a 
complicated relationship.  The presence of financial penalties suggests that managers do 
not voluntarily comply with regulations (reducing compliance), but may nevertheless 
motivate managers to comply if sufficiently strong (increasing compliance) (Christ 2013, 
Cialdini et al. 2004, Gneezy & Rustichini 2000, Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). Thus, 
research concludes broadly that financial penalties increase compliance only when strong 
enough to offset the decreases in compliance that they provoke. However, recent research 
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acknowledges that sanctions may also include social penalties, triggering distrust, 
disapproval and loss of respect. Social penalties heighten cooperation and compliance, 
leading managers to sometimes comply with rules even when illicit financial gains 
exceed risk-weighted fines (Dugar 2010, Noussair & Tucker 2005, Rege & Telle 2004, 
Masclet et al. 2003). 
In this study, I hypothesize that fault assignment is a social penalty, and that 
social penalties increase compliance by leading managers to construe their compliance 
differently – as an ethical rather than economic choice (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe 2008, 
Weber et al. 2004, Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999).1 When managers perceive that their 
compliance is an ethical choice, they assign greater weight to social consequences and 
less weight to individual cost-benefit comparisons (Weber et al. 2004, Tenbrunsel & 
Messick 1999). Thus, I predict that managers faced with fault will be more willing to 
comply with costly regulations and more willing to exceed minimum compliance 
thresholds - similar to distinctions between ‘letter of the law’ versus ‘spirit of the law’ 
compliance (Garcia et al. 2014, McBarnet 2001, McBarnet & Whelan 1991). I 
additionally investigate whether this relationship depends on the risk-weighted magnitude 
of fines (‘sanction strength’), a factor that regulators suggest will be greater under no-
fault regimes (Khuzami 2012), or dependent on the target of enforcement settlements, 
manager or firm.  
I test my hypotheses in a laboratory experiment where participants complete one 
of two scenarios adapted from research and SEC litigation. In the scenarios, managers 
choose between complying with costly protective regulations or earning greater profits 
1 For the purposes of this study, fault is an unambiguous record explicating a violation of a legal norm and 
the identity of the violator. This definition conforms to comments made by SEC Chair Mary Jo White 
(White 2013). 
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and compensation in the scenario. One scenario is managerial, where plant managers 
choose if and how much to run pollution control equipment that is costly to operate but 
necessary to protect health and the environment (Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). The other 
scenario is financial, where financial managers must choose if and how to disclose 
unfavorable IPO information that would lower profits but is necessary to protect investors 
from damaging misrepresentation of the issue’s true value. In both scenarios, managers 
are informed of the presence of sanctions for violations, which take the form of a 
settlement agreement that imposes fines and may also require managers to admit fault. 
Managers choose if and how they wish to comply, where higher levels of compliance 
increase social benefits (lower pollution, less mispricing), but also impose greater 
individual costs.  
I utilize a 2 x 2 x 2 between-participants design, manipulating attributes of the 
regulatory sanctions that managers expect to face for violating regulations.2 I manipulate 
whether managers are required to admit fault in the settlement (assigned-fault or no-
fault). Additionally, I manipulate the sanction strength of fines, where strong (weak) 
fines impose financial penalties that exceed (do not exceed) the financial benefits of non-
compliance and sanction target, where manager-targeted sanctions impose penalties on 
the manager him/herself and firm-targeted sanctions impose penalties on the manager’s 
firm. My primary dependent variable is participants’ compliance choice, measured in 
three levels: full compliance (i.e., high quality, ‘spirit of the law’ compliance), minimal 
2 Compared to archival methods, an experimental approach is better-suited to explore managers’ internal 
decision processes and disentangle jointly operative theories.  Additionally, no-fault settlements and the 
quality of compliance they compel have no credible real-world counterfactual (Coffee 2007), complicating 
archival analyses. The experiments employed in this study disentangle these naturally confounded effects, 
using hypothetical conditions with known parameters and choice options, enabling the study to test 
constructs separately (see Libby, Bloomfield, Nelson 2002). 
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compliance (i.e., low quality, ‘letter of the law’ compliance), and non-compliance (i.e., 
violation). Both minimal and full compliance satisfy regulatory requirements, eliminating 
the threat of sanctions.  Full compliance imposes additional individual economic costs in 
the form of additional lost profit and bonus compensation, but also provides additional 
social benefits by either fully eliminating pollution (managerial case) or fully eliminating 
mispricing (financial case). I measure two mediating variables, relating to participants’ 
perceived costs and their decision frame – the perception that compliance reflects either 
an ethical or economic dilemma.  I also measure participants’ expectations for job loss 
and subsequent litigation to control for collateral consequences that lead sanction 
strength to be greater when penalties include fault, separate from any social awareness 
that fault brings. 
Results with a sample of 480 experienced participants partially support my 
hypotheses.  I find that managers more frequently perceive their compliance choice to be 
ethical in nature when fault assignment is combined with manager-targeted sanctions, 
relative to manager-targeted no-fault sanctions.  And, managers who perceive their 
compliance choice to be ethical in nature comply more frequently with costly regulations, 
and with higher quality compliance.  I also find that managers in firm-targeted sanction 
conditions are more likely to perceive their compliance to be ethical in nature relative to 
manager-targeted no-fault sanctions; however, fault assignment does not facilitate 
incrementally greater ethical perceptions among managers in firm-targeted sanction 
conditions.   
I also find that all manipulated sanction attributes – fault assignment, increased 
sanction strength, and targeting managers with sanctions – separately lead managers to 
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perceive greater costs associated with accepting settlements, and that greater cost 
perceptions are associated with more frequent and higher quality compliance.  However, I 
also observe that interactions of manipulated sanction attributes are negatively related to 
cost perceptions, consistent with decreasing incremental benefits of additional sanction 
attributes with regard to managers’ cost perceptions. In regressions that control for 
managers’ cost perceptions and ethical framing, I observe that conditions with manager-
targeted sanctions that assign fault still demonstrate greater overall compliance, 
consistent with partial mediation. 
On the whole, my findings support the idea that sanctions facilitate greater 
compliance both by directly assigning costs to violations and by indirectly facilitating 
greater ethical decision frames.  In my study, ethical decision frames are higher in 
conditions that trigger greater social sanctions, either by assigning managers the socially 
deleterious label ‘fault’, or by assigning penalties to the managers’ coworkers such as 
through firm-targeted sanctions.  Managers’ ethical decision frames result in greater and 
higher quality compliance relative to the compliance compelled through financial 
penalties alone.  
In supplemental analysis, I make several additional observations.  First, in 
subsample analyses of participants who are either high or low in ‘dark triad’ personality 
traits (narcissism, machiavellianism, subclinical psychopathy – see Paulhaus & Williams 
2002), I find that my results are stronger for the high triad subsample than for the low 
triad subsample.  Research suggests that the senior-most leaders of organizations, who 
commonly make compliance choices, are higher in dark triad personality traits than the 
general population (O’Reilly et al. 2014). I additionally decompose managers’ cost 
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perceptions into costs arising from economic sources (e.g. financial penalties) and those 
arising from social sources (e.g. reputation and relationship loss).  I find that social costs 
are associated with both more frequent and higher quality compliance, but economic 
costs are positively associated only with more frequent compliance, and negatively 
associated with high quality compliance. Lastly, in a supplemental condition with 
privately resolved manager-targeted settlements, I find that privately assigned fault is also 
associated with an increased prevalence of ethical decision frames but that this does not 
translate into greater compliance for privately assigned sanctions. This suggests that 
expectations for social consequences may be important for translating ethical perceptions 
into ethical behavior. 
My study makes several important contributions to policy-makers and 
researchers. Foremost, my study is the first to my knowledge to document the compliance 
consequences of fault, an active policy matter.  In my study, when fault is combined with 
manager-targeted sanctions, managers’ ethical decision frames and compliance are 
greater than when managers were targeted with no-fault sanctions.  That is, managers 
perceive sanctions with manager-targeted fault differently – fault does not simply 
increase the perceived strength of sanctions.  I also find that managers’ ethical decision 
frames and compliance are greater when sanctions target the firm rather than managers.  
One interpretation of these findings is that managers are more likely to perceive 
compliance choices to be ethical in nature when they expect social sanctions, triggered by 
the fault label or by coworkers being penalized for the managers’ own misdeeds.  This 
contributes to experimental research suggesting that the notion of sanctions should be 
broadened to include social penalties (Dugar 2010, Noussair & Tucker 2005, Rege & 
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Telle 2004, Masclet et al. 2003), and also compliments archival research suggesting 
that economic penalties are weak predictors of compliance (Williams & Hawkins 1989, 
Pratt & Cullen 2005). On the whole, my study suggests that the compliance compelled 
through fines is not always equivalent to the compliance compelled through social 
sanctions, such as manager-targeted fault (Dugar 2010, Noussair & Tucker 2005, 
Mascelet et al. 2003, Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999).  
My study also makes a methodological contribution by allowing for differences in 
compliance quality, a distinction of importance to regulators, researchers, and the public.  
Compliance quality in this study reflects participants’ willingness to incur greater 
individual costs to effect greater social benefits, consistent with arguments for ‘spirit of 
the law’ versus ‘letter of the law’ compliance.  In this study, I find that many participants 
select high quality compliance when given the option; more do so in the presence of 
manager-targeted fault.   
This study proceeds as follows.  Section II lays out relevant background and 
motivates the hypotheses.  Section III outlines the research design.  Section IV discusses 
tests of hypotheses and supplementary analysis.  Section V concludes the study. 
II. BACKGROUND & HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
II. A. Background
No-Fault Settlements 
The SEC is an active regulatory enforcer, averaging 722 enforcement actions per 
year and $3.53 B in financial sanctions annually, from 2012 through 2014 (SEC 2015, 
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see also Coffee 2007).3, 4 The SEC relies heavily on ‘no-fault settlements,’ where 
enforcement targets agree to penalties without admitting to or denying fault.5 Settlements 
avoid costly and protracted litigation for both the SEC and enforcement targets, enabling 
the SEC to pursue roughly twice as many cases as it might otherwise (Eaglesham & 
Ackerman 2013). However, the SEC’s emphasis of no-fault settlements is also 
contentious. Opponents argue that removing fault from enforcement reduces financial 
violations to a ‘cost of business’, enabling offenders to ‘buy their way out of a violation’ 
(Ackerman & Rexrode 2014, Eaglesham & Ackerman 2013). That is, removing fault 
from sanctions may diminish the salience of ethical aspects of violations – reducing 
compliance and sanctions to a price (Gneezy & Rustichini 2000).  
Although accounting research does not directly inform the consequences of 
assigning fault in enforcement actions, it finds evidence of several types of ‘collateral 
consequences’ that are plausibly linked to fault – indirect economic penalties that add to 
fines imposed by the SEC.6 Several studies note that firms and managers targeted by the 
SEC may experience additional civil lawsuits (Bowen, Call, & Rajgopal 2010; Karpoff, 
3 The SEC is a regulatory agency.  Thus, the SEC’s enforcement actions are civil rather than criminal in 
nature.  The primary differences for the purpose of this study are a) that SEC cases, although public, do not 
influence one’s criminal record (i.e. ‘felon’, etc.) and b) that the SEC cannot sanction guilty parties with 
prison sentences.  The Department of Justice enforces criminal law. Some, but not all, of the SEC’s 
administrative regulations overlap with related criminal law and investigations.   
4 For perspective, the UK’s equivalent agency (FSA, which is also the SEC’s nearest peer) initiated 52 
enforcement actions per year over the same period, triggering a comparatively modest £308.97 M 
($475.81M) in sanctions (KL Gates 2015 – see also Coffee 2007). 
5 SEC Chair Mary Jo White and Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami have recently made statements 
indicating the SEC intends to pursue fault in some cases (Mahoney 2014, Eaglesham & Ackerman 2013, 
Kuzami 2012).  However, both representatives also indicate that no-fault settlements would remain the 
primary mode of sanctioning for the SEC, seeking fault from individuals who have already been assigned 
fault in other venues. 
6 Most SEC fines are capped at ‘ill-gotten gains’ (typically excluding punative fines and/or damages).  
Thus, SEC penalties are by definition weak in that the risk-weighted value of fines are legally capped at the 
benefits of violation; their risk-weighted value is likely to be lower given that enforcement may not be 
perfect.  Follow-up litigation adds to financial penalties, but are outside the control of regulators and not the 
subject of this investigation. 
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Sanctions 
Lee, & Martin 2008b) and, in the case of managers, job loss (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin 
2008a; Desai, Hogan, & Wilkins 2006). In the present study, I argue that fault assignment 
alters how managers perceive their compliance, separate from any economic 
consequences (including collateral consequences). That is, fault does more than increase 
sanction strength; it increases the tendency of managers to perceive their compliance as 
an ethical choice.  Consequently, when faced with fault, managers’ compliance is less 
dependent on the magnitude of direct and indirect economic penalties. I expand on this 
argument below. 
Compliance, Sanctioning Systems, and Decision Frames 
In this study, I examine managers’ compliance, a form of ethical behavior rooted 
in ethical decision-making as defined by Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe (2008). Following 
Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe (2008), an individual has complied with legal and social 
norms when s/he has selected a decision that is both legally and socially acceptable. I 
additionally distinguish high quality compliance from low quality compliance, 
acknowledging that managers sometimes prefer to minimally satisfy legal requirements.  
Minimally satisfying legal compliance avoids sanctions, but may also offer fewer social  
FIGURE 1: BASE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 1 2 
3 4 
5
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benefits than fully complying with the intent of the law (Garcia et al. 2014, Mulder et 
al. 2006, McBarnet 2001, McBarnet & Whelan 1991). I deem cases when an individual 
complies only with minimal legal requirements, in spite of the opportunity to provide 
greater social benefits, to be low quality compliance; I define high quality compliance as 
cases where an individual exceeds minimum legal requirements, providing greater social 
benefits.  
Individuals are compelled to comply with legal and social norms through a variety 
of formal and informal incentive systems that may be either economic or social in nature. 
That is, individuals care about and seek to avoid economic sanctions such as fines and/or 
imprisonment (Sefton et al. 2006, Grasmick & Bryjak 1980). They also care about and 
seek to avoid social sanctions, such as the discomfort of losing self-respect, or losing the 
respect of and relationships with others (Dugar 2010, Noussair & Tucker 2005, Bandura 
1991, Grasmick & Bursik 1990, see also Rankin et al. 2008). 
Regulators compel compliance through formal sanctions, which are typically 
discussed in terms of the financial penalties they impose. Financial penalties increase 
compliance by reducing the economic benefits of violating regulations (deemed a 
‘processing effect’, Figure 1, Links 1 & 2)  (Karpoff et al. 2008a, 2008b, Mulder et al. 
2006, Gneezy & Rustichini 2000, Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). However, financial 
penalties also decrease compliance by reducing the prevalence of cooperative norms that 
underlie voluntary compliance (deemed a ‘signaling effect’, Figure 1, Links 3 & 4). 
Financial sanctions signal that others do not comply with regulations voluntarily, leading 
more managers to adopt individualistic strategies based on cost-benefit calculus (Christ 
2013, Tayler & Bloomfeld 2011, Falk & Kosfeld 2006, Fehr & Rockenbach 2003, 
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Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). Research across several studies supports the processing / 
signaling model, finding that financial penalties lead individuals to suspect that self-
interested behavior is appropriate, and to also behave in a self-interested manner – which 
results in greater compliance when sanctions are sufficiently strong, but lower 
compliance otherwise (Tayler & Bloomfield 2011, Rankin et al. 2008, Weber et al. 2004, 
Towry 2003, Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). 
Lastly, research has linked the compliance-decreasing signaling effect to 
managers’ decision frames, which can be thought of as groups of social norms that 
individuals invoke depending on their present setting (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe 2008, 
Weber et al. 2004, Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). Research theorizes that managers 
possess different categorical definitions for decision-making settings, which differently 
emphasize managerial norms and objectives such as social versus individual welfare.  
Managers invoke categorical definitions for their decisions based on social cues in the 
setting. When managers observe signals of trust or cooperation, they are more likely to 
invoke ethical decision frames that emphasize social outcomes, and are consequently 
more likely to incur individual costs to cooperate (e.g. complying with costly regulations) 
(Figure 1, Links 3 & 4); when managers observe signals of distrust or defection, they are 
more likely to invoke self-interested ‘economic’ decision frames, and are consequently 
less likely to incur individual costs to comply. 
II.B Hypothesis Development
Fault 
This study investigates a penalty that is sometimes conveyed in sanctions – fault. 
For the purposes of this study, fault is an unambiguous record explicating a violation of a 
12 
legal norm and the identity of the violator. Fault has at least two primary consequences, 
one financial in nature (relating to sanctions’ processing effect) and one social in nature 
(relating to sanctions’ signaling effect). First, as accounting research implies, fault 
triggers indirect financial penalties by increasing the prospect of costly follow-up 
litigation and job loss (‘collateral consequences’, Bowen, Call, & Rajgopal 2010; 
Karpoff, Lee, & Martin 2008a, 2008b, Desai, Hogan, & Wilkins 2006).  To the extent 
that fault is more likely to be sought in cases of gross violations, fault may also directly 
coincide with greater financial penalties. Consequently, I predict that managers will 
perceive the cost of sanctions to be greater when fault is assigned in sanctions. 
H1a: Managers will perceive costs to be greater under a sanctioning regime 
that assigns fault to sanctions than under a regime that imposes sanctions 
with only economic penalties.   
Traditional notions of sanctions as instruments of financial penalty would predict 
that fault matters in compliance, but only to the extent that it triggers greater financial 
penalties (i.e., greater sanction strength). However, fault also has a second function 
relating to its signaling effects. Fault serves as a social penalty, explicitly assigning 
responsibility for a social violation and facilitating social recourse (e.g. reputation and 
relationship loss). That is, fault assignment also signals that the manager’s choice is 
occurring in a context where social outcomes matter, fostering expectations for social 
penalties such as disassociation, distrust, and/or loss of respect (Mulder et al. 2009, 
Grasmick & Bursik 1990, Williams & Hawkins 1986). Moreover, fault assignment also 
reduces managers’ ‘moral wriggle room’ in the face of violations by increasing the 
certainty of the link between self-interested choices and their social costs (Dana, Weber, 
& Kuang 2007).  Thus, managers are more likely to perceive and weight social 
13 
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dimensions in their decision-making, leading managers to increasingly invoke ethical 
decision frames in the presence of fault. 
H1b: More managers will invoke ethical decision frames under a 
sanctioning regime that assigns fault to sanctions than under a regime that 
imposes sanctions with only economic penalties.   
FIGURE 2: DETAILED MODEL & PREDICTIONS 
 
Sanction Strength & Sanction Target 
The effects of fault on compliance may depend on factors that sometimes vary in 
sanctions.  In particular, regulators may increase the strength of sanctions by imposing 
larger fines and/or pursuing greater numbers of enforcement actions. And, regulators may 
target firms rather than managers in their enforcement actions.  These possibilities are 
discussed further below. 
H1a 
H2a 
H1b 
H2b 
RQ1 
H6a 
H6b 
H3 
H4 
H5 
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Regulators justify their emphasis of no-fault settlements on the basis of increased 
enforcement expediency (White 2013, Khuzami 2012).  No-fault settlements enable the 
SEC to investigate greater numbers of enforcement actions because enforcement targets 
offer less resistance to no-fault sanctions, freeing regulatory resources to pursue 
additional cases.  This increases sanction strength by increasing the risk that non-
compliant managers will face sanctions for violations, leading the risk-weighted 
magnitude of fines to be greater. Managers should perceive costs to be greater when 
sanction strength greater because costs are in reality greater. I test this relationship but 
advance no hypothesis. 
Prior research presents conflicting theory and evidence on what effect sanction 
strength should have on the signaling portion of the sanction-compliance relationship. 
Stronger financial penalties may be perceived as both signaling the presence of stronger 
descriptive norms of violation (reducing ethical frames) and also signaling stronger 
injunctive norms of compliance (increasing ethical frames) (Mulder et al. 2009). This is 
because stronger penalties suggest that violating managers are not deterred by weak 
penalties. On the contrary, penalties also signal the comparative importance of the issue 
to regulators, with stronger penalties being assigned to issues where compliance is more 
important (Shalvi et al. 2012, Mulder et al. 2009, Tyran & Feld 2002). Because theory 
offers competing predictions for the effects of sanction strength on managers’ ethical 
decision frames, I state my investigation of sanction strength on managers’ ethical 
decision frames in the form of a research question.  
RQ1: Will more managers invoke ethical decision frames under a sanctioning 
regime that assigns strong financial penalties than under a regime that assigns weak 
financial penalties?   
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Sanctions sometimes target firms rather than managers, going so far as to 
withhold perpetrating managers’ identities from enforcement fact patterns even when the 
managers’ names appear to be known (e.g. Citigroup – see Zamensky 2011). With regard 
to the processing path of the sanction-compliance relationship, targeting firms with 
sanctions assigns responsibility for paying fines to the firm.  Agency theory asserts that 
managers will be less concerned with costs that they do not personally bear. 
Consequently, I predict that managers will perceive the costs of sanctions to be lower 
when sanctions target firms rather than managers, for any level of sanction strength. 
H2a: Managers will perceive costs to be lower under a sanctioning regime 
that targets firms than under a regime that targets managers.  
Targeting firms with sanctions also influences the signaling portion of the 
sanction-compliance relationship.  Relative to manager-targeted sanctions, firm-targeted 
sanctions may tend to foster managers’ ethical decision frames for two reasons.  First, 
when sanctions target firms, violations potentially injure an additional party – the 
managers’ coworkers – making social outcomes salient.  When the firm faces penalties, 
coworkers may experience job hardship, embarrassment, and/or job loss.  In addition to 
any altruistic concern that managers experience for coworkers, they may also feel 
concern for social retribution from coworkers who are likely to know and blame 
perpetrating managers for bringing hardship on the firm.  Secondly, when sanctions target 
managers, the managers are likely to perceive the presence of protective regulations as 
being more restrictive and adversarial in nature, potentially undermining managers’ 
perceptions that compliance reflects an ethical choice (Cialdini et al. 2004, Brehm 1972).  
Consequently, I predict that managers will be more likely to invoke ethical decision 
frames when sanctions target the firm than when they target managers. 
16 
H2b: More managers will invoke ethical decision frames under a 
sanctioning regime that targets firms than under a regime that targets 
managers.   
Interactions 
The effects of fault on managers’ ethical decision frames may increase when 
sanctions target managers relative to when they target firms.  In particular, the social 
awareness and ethical perceptions triggered by fault may depend on the expectation that 
the fault label will be assigned to the manager him/herself.  When fault is assigned to the 
firm, the manager may expect fewer reputational and relationship consequences because 
the assignment of fault to an external party creates plausible deniability that can be 
exploited by the manager, and may also create ‘moral wriggle room’ in the manager’s 
own mind (Dana et al. 2007).  I therefore predict that the signaling effects of fault will be 
greater when sanctions target managers than when they target firms. 
H3: The effects of fault on managers’ ethical decision frames will be greater 
under a sanctioning regime that targets managers than under a regime that 
targets firms. 
Likewise, increased sanction strength may matter more to managers who are 
themselves targeted by the sanctions than to managers who expect fines to be paid 
by the firm.  That is, even when managers are aware of and concerned with the 
magnitude of financial penalties, they may nevertheless be less sensitive to 
differences in the magnitude of penalties that they will not be held personally 
liable for.  Thus, I predict that the perceived differences between strong and weak 
sanction strength will be greater when sanctions target managers than when 
sanctions target firms. 
H4: The effects of sanction strength on perceived costs will be greater under 
a sanctioning regime that targets managers than under a regime that targets 
firms. 
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Lastly, to the extent that fault and sanction strength are substitutes, it is 
possible that managers’ perceptions and compliance will be subject to ceiling 
effects: once penalties are made sufficiently strong - either through fault 
assignment or through prohibitive financial penalties - then managers’ perceptions 
and compliance may be less sensitive to the presence of additional sanction 
dimensions.  That is, to the extent that fault increases sanction strength, 
combining fault with strong sanctions may not be perceived differently than 
strong sanctions would be perceived in isolation.  Consequently, I predict that the 
effects of fault will be weaker in the presence of strong sanctions than in the 
presence of weak sanctions, reflecting the tendency of fault to increase managers’ 
perceptions of sanction strength.  
H5: The effects of sanction strength on managers’ perceived costs will be 
weaker under a sanctioning regime that assigns fault to sanctions than under 
a regime that imposes sanctions with only economic penalties. 
Compliance Quality 
As discussed in Section II.A, research finds that managers can be compelled 
to comply through stronger sanctions; and, that managers who adopt ethical 
decision frames demonstrate a greater willingness to incur individual costs to 
cooperate, such as by complying with costly protective regulations (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick 1999, Messick 1999). However, prior research does not speak to whether 
compliance compelled through penalties and/or ethical decision frames is likely to 
be of low quality (similar to impression management and cost minimization) or of 
high quality (similar to altruism or risk aversion). That is, self-interested 
managers can eliminate substantially all possible social penalties by minimally 
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satisfying regulatory requirements and thus avoiding penalties (including the 
stigma of ‘fault’).  But, they can also achieve greater social benefits and possibly 
reduce the chances of triggering sanctions through higher quality compliance. I 
therefore hypothesize that managers’ compliance will be at least as frequent when 
faced with sanctions perceived to be costly or when invoking ethical decision 
frames, and may be of higher quality.  
H6a: Managers who perceive greater costs to sanctions will comply more 
frequently and will be more likely to select high quality compliance.   
H6b: Managers adopting ethical decision frames will comply more frequently 
and will be more likely to select high quality compliance.   
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
III.A Participants
Participants are 480 experienced participants recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk marketplace.7 48.5% of participants are male and participants’ average 
age is 36.4 (std. dev. 11.1 yrs, range 19 – 83 yrs). Participants report an average of 13.9 
years of work experience (std. dev.12.1 yrs), 67.6% report having supervisory experience. 
Participants are compensated $1.00 for completing the electronic case, which takes an 
average of 27.5 minutes.  
III.B Procedures
Each case consists of five basic parts, all completed electronically: a) background 
& information, b) knowledge check, c) case scenario, d) retention check, and e) exit 
survey. Participants first receive instructions and background information relating to the 
7 523 participants complete the instrument. 12 responses are removed for failing attention check questions. 
31 responses are removed for failing retention check questions.  Results are qualitatively similar when 
these observations are included.  ‘Attention checks’ and ‘retention checks’ are described in Section III.B. 
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case, including descriptions of the managers’ role and the regulatory environment. 
Before proceeding, participants must complete a short ‘knowledge check’ ensuring they 
understand important information about the study; participants may not proceed until 
they have correctly completed all of the knowledge check questions but may review the 
case information and retake incorrect questions.  Participants then receive the remaining 
case information, which includes a description of the manager’s present scenario, choice 
options and consequences, as described below.  Immediately following case choices, 
participants complete ‘retention check’ questions that ask participants to recall important 
case information (e.g. sanction target, sanction amounts, fault admission, etc.). Lastly, 
participants complete demographic and psychometric scales in exit questions and receive 
a code used for payment.  Embedded within exit questions are three ‘attention checks’ 
that prompt participants to select a specific response (e.g. ‘please select disagree’).  These 
questions serve to identify participants who may be answering questions without first 
reading corresponding questions completely. 
III.C Case Scenarios
Participants complete one of two scenarios – either a managerial case where 
participants assume the role of a plant manager in a manufacturing firm, or a financial 
case where participants assume the role of an underwriting manager in a financial 
services firm.8  In both cases, managers choose between complying with costly protective 
8 I use two cases (rather than one) to reduce internal validity concerns relating to inferences drawn from a 
single case (e.g. results may be case-specific).  To the extent that results hold across cases/settings, I have 
greater confidence that they reflect the constructs of interest.   
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regulations or earning greater profit, where higher quality compliance imposes greater 
individual costs but also provides greater social benefits.9   
In the managerial case, participants act as a plant manager of a facility that 
generates a toxic gas as a by-product of its production. The gas is harmful to health and 
the environment but costly pollution control equipment can reduce or eliminate the gas 
(depending on how much it is operated). Regulations mandate that managers run the 
pollution control equipment at least 80% of the time, which lowers the volume of emitted 
gas to a level deemed acceptable by health and environmental experts.10  Managers 
choose if and how much to run the costly equipment. 
In the financial case, participants act as an underwriting manager in a financial 
services firm who has received unfavorable information about an important IPO client 
her firm is underwriting. Regulations mandate that the underwriter disclose the 
unfavorable information to avoid misrepresenting the IPO’s actual value to investors.  
However, doing so reduces the expected IPO price, and thus the firm’s profit and the 
manager’s own profit-sharing bonus. Managers choose if and how to disclose the 
information, which can be communicated fully and transparently (eliminating predictable 
investor losses and the manager’s expected bonus), communicated with intentionally 
confusing language and fine print (partially reducing investor losses and bonus 
9 The present case partly relates to social penalties that individuals expect for violating legal and/or social 
norms.  Relative to abstract laboratory tasks, cases have the advantage of evoking concerns for reputation 
and relationship loss among participants’ external, long-standing and naturally developed relationships. 
10 In addition to employing a different context, the managerial case differs in at least two ways from the 
financial case, and thus does not (and was not intended to) serve as an additional manipulation.  First, the 
case additionally includes a cooperative element, noting that the entire industry faces stricter and more 
costly regulation if fewer than 80% of all manufacturing plants comply. Second, the negative externalities 
created by non-compliance in the managerial scenario are largely borne by the environment (rather than by 
people, in the financial scenario).  These differences tend to weaken the appeal of ethical frames and 
compliance relative to the financial case; the differences tend to increase the internal validity of inferences 
drawn from the effects of sanction attributes such as fault on managers’ perceptions and compliance. 
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compensation), or not disclosed (reducing neither the manager’s bonus nor investors 
losses, but exposing the manager to enforcement risks).   
Both scenarios include information about regulatory enforcement that impacts the 
manager’s hypothetical welfare, but does not impact participants’ actual compensation 
for participating.  The cases describe the probability and nature of future sanctions 
expected in the scenario (greater detail below).  In the scenarios, managers may be 
audited by regulators who launch publicly recorded investigations of managers appearing 
to have violated regulations. Scenarios explain that investigations typically conclude with 
a settlement that avoids costly and protracted litigation for both sides; settlements impose 
the same financial penalties as would be imposed after trial, and may also require 
enforcement targets to admit fault, depending on condition. Thus, managers’ compliance 
choices are made with knowledge of expected penalties. This knowledge influences the 
expected financial consequences of non-compliance and may also influence managers’ 
ethical frames.  
III.D Manipulated and Measured Variables
Independent Variables 
I employ a 2 x 2 x 2 between participants design, manipulating three attributes of 
the settlement sanctions that individuals face for violating regulations – fault, sanction 
strength, and target.  I manipulate fault at two levels – assigned-fault or no-fault. Fault is 
a dimension of sanctions where, in addition to economic penalties such as fines, 
managers are required to admit to violating a legal norm in an unambiguous public 
record. Fault assignment is manipulated within case information, immediately following 
a discussion of financial penalties imposed on managers found to have violated 
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regulations. Participants in the no-fault condition are informed that the settlement 
includes language stating that managers do not admit or deny fault in the matter. In the 
fault condition, participants are instead informed that managers are required to admit 
fault in the settlement. 
I also manipulate sanction strength at two levels – weak or strong. Sanction 
strength is the risk-weighted economic cost of sanctions relative to the economic benefits 
gained from violating regulations. Strong (weak) sanctions impose risk-weighted costs 
that exceed (do not exceed) the financial gains derived from violating regulations.  
Sanction strength is manipulated within case information, by influencing the probability 
and magnitude of fines imposed in settlements. Sanctions are either weak (in the financial 
scenario, a 5% chance of receiving a $25,000 fine) or strong (greater than 50% chance of 
receiving a $2,000,000 fine).11 From a purely economic perspective, violation is a 
dominant strategy under weak sanctions, but minimal compliance is a dominant strategy 
under strong sanctions. 
Lastly, I manipulate sanction target at two levels – firm or manager. Sanction 
target reflects the party held legally accountable in enforcement actions. When sanctions 
target the firm, financial penalties and fault (when applicable) are assigned to the firm.  
When sanctions target the manager, he or she is personally liable to regulators for 
payment of financial penalties and any admission of fault.  Target is manipulated within 
case information, through a statement indicating that either the manager or the firm will 
be subject to investigation and any resulting penalties.   
11 Computations for net costs benefits are as follows. Weak Sanctions: $25,000 of lost compensation for 
minimal disclosure less $5,000 risk-weighted cost of sanctions = $20,000 net benefit. Strong Sanctions: 
$25,000 of lost compensation for minimal disclosure less $1,000,000 risk-weighted cost of sanctions = 
$975,000 net loss 
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Dependent Variables 
The primary dependent variable in the study is managers’ compliance level 
measured at three levels. Participants in the managerial case are asked how much they 
would like to run pollution control equipment (0% to 100%, using a slider); participants 
in the financial case are asked to select one of three options for disclosing the unfavorable 
IPO information: a) full update (fully and transparently communicating the unfavorable 
information), b) minimal update (employing complex and legalistic language that is 
difficult to understand) or c) no update (corresponding to violation). In the managerial 
case, responses below 80% operating time are coded as non-compliant (reflecting 
violation), responses of 80% - 82% are coded as minimally compliant (reflecting low-
quality compliance that meets legal requirements but withholds some social benefits), and 
responses exceeding 82% are coded as fully compliant (reflecting high-quality 
compliance that offers greater social benefits than the legal lower threshold).12   See 
Figure 2.  In the financial case, the no update option is coded as non-compliant, the 
minimal update option is coded as minimally compliant, and the full update option is 
coded as fully compliant.   
In analyses relating to the overall frequency of compliance (‘total compliance’), I 
convert compliance level into a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 when participants 
select either minimal compliance or full compliance, and 0 when participants choose not 
12 Results are robust to all alternative thresholds for differentiating minimal and full compliance, from 81% 
to 99%.  I employ an 82% threshold.  This maps to construct definitions by setting a narrow range for 
minimal compliance levels (80% - 82%) to reflect the notion that higher quality compliance offers more 
than minimal compliance.  The 82% threshold also maps to participants’ actual choices, where most 
compliance choices were for 80% scrubber time (152 of 251), 81% scrubber time (18 or 251), or for 100% 
scrubber time (49 of 251), with few responses selecting compliance levels between 82% and 99%.  See 
Figure 2 
24 
to comply.  This measure reflects the amount of compliance observed, without regard to 
variations in the quality of the compliance.  
Mediating Variables 
I measure two mediating variables, relating to the processing and signaling paths 
in the sanction-compliance relationship.  First I measure managers’ perceived costs, 
which is predicted to correspond with increased compliance through the ‘processing’ 
portion of the sanction-compliance relationship.  Participants’ perceived costs are elicited 
through two Likert (7 point) questions embedded in a set of questions that follow the 
FIGURE 3: HISTOGRAM OF COMPLIANCE CHOICES 
compliance choice question.  The questions prompt participants to indicate their 
agreement with the belief that the overall costs of sanctions to the manager and to the 
firm are high (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).13  Perceived costs is the average 
13 The exact language of the two questions is: 1) “Considering all of the possible risks and costs – the 
potential downside of violating pollution control/misrepresentation regulations is high for you (the plant 
manager/underwriter)” 2) “Considering all of the possible risks and costs – the potential downside of 
violating pollution control/misrepresentation regulations is high for your firm” 
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of participants’ responses to the two questions, where higher scores indicate greater 
perceptions that the cost of settlements are high. 
I also measure managers’ ethical frame, which is predicted to correspond with 
increased compliance through the ‘signaling’ portion of the sanction-compliance 
relationship. Participants’ decision frame is elicited immediately following their 
compliance choice, through a question that prompts participants to select the option that 
best describes the choice that participants were asked to make in the case (order 
randomized) - ‘an economic choice’, ‘an ethical choice’, ‘a legal choice’, ‘a personal 
choice’, or ‘other (please elaborate)’. In the managerial case, participants are given an 
additional option: ‘an environmental choice’. The options are taken from Tenbrunsel and 
Messick (1999) and are intended to provide insight on the categorical definition that 
participants invoked in their decision-making. Participants’ responses are categorized as 
one of ‘ethical’, ‘economic/legal’, or ‘other’. 
Control Variables 
I measure and control for three factors that may influence managers’ cost 
perceptions and ethical frames (my mediating measures) and/or compliance (my 
dependent measure).  First, I code participants’ self-reported gender – a factor sometimes 
noted in research to influence cooperation and compliance (Charness & Rustichini 2011, 
Croson & Gneezy 2009).  Participants’ self-report identified gender with other 
demographic information at the conclusion of the survey.  I code participants who 
identify as male as 1, and those who identify as female as 0. 
I also control for the possibility that individuals expect greater indirect economic 
penalties when faced with fault assignment, deemed collateral consequences. Participants 
26 
allocate points to 10 decision-making concerns according to how much each influenced 
their compliance decision (order randomized). Collateral Consequences is the averaged 
and standardized amount that each participant assigns to (1) Possibility of being sued if 
caught, and (2) the possibility of getting fired, with other options reflecting direct 
economic (e.g. probability and magnitude of fines) or social (e.g. reputation and 
relationship loss) consequences. 
Lastly, to control for differences in context-dependent perceptions evoked by the 
financial or managerial nature of the case, I include an indicator variable for case in my 
analyses.  I code participants receiving the financial case as 1, and code participants 
receiving the managerial case as 0. 
IV. RESULTS
IV.A Manipulation Checks 
I employ three manipulation checks, corresponding to my three independent 
measures.  After making their compliance choices, participants respond to several Likert 
questions (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) reflecting the perceived magnitude 
of social, financial and overall costs associated with accepting settlements.14  Participants 
in assigned fault conditions perceive greater social costs associated with accepting 
settlements than participants in no-fault conditions (t-stat = 1.62, p-value = 0.05).  I 
conclude that fault assignment was successfully manipulated.  Participants in manager-
targeted sanction conditions perceive greater economic costs associated with accepting 
14 The exact language of the questions is: For economic costs - “From the standpoint of you (the 
manager)/the firm, if an investigation was launched and a settlement reached – the fine associated with 
accepting the settlement could damage your personal finances (7-strongly agree, 1-strongly disagree)”.  For 
social costs -  “From the standpoint of you (the manager)/the firm, if an investigation was launched and a 
settlement reached – your reputation and relationships would be damaged (7-strongly agree, 1-strongly 
disagree)”. 
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settlements than participants in firm-targeted sanction conditions (t-stat = 8.82, p-value 
= 0.00). I conclude that sanction target was successfully manipulated.  Participants in 
strong sanction conditions perceive greater economic costs for accepting settlements than 
those in weak sanction conditions (t-stat = 1.31, p-value = 0.10).  I conclude that sanction 
strength was successfully manipulated. 
IV.B Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.  Panel A of Table 1 reports 
compliance overall and by each independent variable.  Overall, 93.8% of participants 
choose either minimal or full compliance (53.8% select minimal compliance, 40.0% 
select full compliance). On average, 39.8% of participants indicate that they perceive the 
case to be primarily ethical in nature.  The average perceived cost of accepting a 
settlement is 5.18 out 7.00.  95.9% of participants in the assigned-fault condition choose 
to comply with regulations (52.5% select minimal compliance, 43.4% select full 
compliance). In the no-fault condition, 91.5% choose to comply with regulations (55.1% 
select minimal compliance, 33.4% select full compliance). 44.3% of participants in 
assigned-fault conditions describe the case as being ethical in nature, while 35.2% of 
participants do so in no-fault conditions.  The average perceived cost of accepting a 
settlement is 5.38 out of 7.00 for participants in assigned-fault conditions, and 4.97 out of 
7.00 for participants in no-fault conditions. 
When comparing strong versus weak sanctions, 96.1% of participants in strong 
sanction conditions choose at least minimal compliance (55.7% select minimal 
compliance, 40.4% select full compliance). 91.6% of participants faced with weak 
sanctions select at least minimal compliance (52.0% select minimal compliance, 39.6% 
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select full compliance). Of participants in conditions with strong sanctions, 35.6% of 
participants identify their compliance as being an ethical choice, while 43.6% of 
participants in weak sanction conditions do so.   The average perceived cost of accepting 
a settlement is 5.40 out of 7.00 in strong sanction conditions, and 4.96 out of 7.00 in 
weak sanction conditions. 
When comparing manager-targeted sanction conditions to firm-targeted sanction 
conditions, 96.3% of participants in manager-targeted sanction conditions choose at least 
minimal compliance (55.6% select minimal compliance, 40.7% select full compliance). 
91.2% of participants faced with firm-targeted sanctions select at least minimal 
compliance (51.9% select minimal compliance, 39.3% select full compliance). 38.2% of 
participants in manager-targeted sanction conditions identify their compliance as being an 
ethical choice, while 41.4% of participants in firm-targeted sanction conditions do so.  
The average perceived cost of accepting a settlement is 5.57 out of 7.00 when sanctions 
target managers, and 4.78 out of 7.00 when sanctions target the firm. 
On the whole, univariate means are consistent with predictions that compliance is 
greater in assigned fault conditions, when sanctions are stronger, and when managers are 
targeted by sanctions.  Means are also consistent with ethical frames being more 
prevalent among managers faced with fault-assignment and firm-targeted sanctions, and 
with perceived sanction strength being greater when sanctions are stronger, when they 
assign fault, and when they target managers. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all eight conditions.  Broadly, 
results are consistent with fault being an important determinant of compliance when 
sanctions target managers, with 100.0% compliance for both conditions that assign fault 
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to managers, but 93.3% (strong manager no-fault) and 91.4% (weak manager no-fault) 
in conditions with manager-targeted no-fault sanctions.15 Results are also consistent with 
sanction strength being an important determinant of compliance when sanctions target the 
firm, with 96.5% compliance (strong firm assigned-fault) and 94.7% compliance (strong 
firm no-fault) in firm-targeted conditions with strong sanctions compared to 87.5% 
compliance (weak firm assigned-fault) and 86.9% compliance (weak firm no-fault) for 
firm-targeted weak sanctions.  This corresponds to a somewhat wider range in the cost 
perceptions for firm-targeted sanctions (4.01 of 7.00 for weak firm no-fault sanctions, 
compared to 5.35 of 7.00 for strong firm assigned-fault sanctions) than for manager-
targeted sanctions (5.43 of 7.00 for strong manager no-fault sanctions, compared to 5.85 
of 7.00 for strong manager assigned fault sanctions).  Ethical perceptions in manager-
targeted conditions are 26.7% and 31.0% for strong and weak no-fault sanctions 
respectively, but 41.1% and 52.2% for strong and weak assigned fault sanctions 
respectively. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports participants’ compliance choices by their decision 
frame. 98.4% of participants reporting an ethical decision frame comply with regulations 
(33.0% select minimal compliance, 65.4% select full compliance). Of participants 
adopting business or legal decision frames, 90.0% choose to comply (71.4% select 
minimal compliance, 17.6% select full compliance). These findings are consistent with 
ethical frame, resulting in both more and higher quality compliance.   
15 Logistic regression analyses of compliance in conditions that exhibit 100% compliance rates rely on 
bootstrapping to estimate effects.  Bootstrapping iterations randomly select and replace the compliance 
choices of 2 compliant participants (1 weak manager-targeted assigned-fault observation and 1 strong 
manager-targeted assigned-fault condition) with a non-compliant choice indicator.   
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Mean  
(Std. Dev) 
Panel A: By Independent Variable 
n 
Ethical 
Frame 
Business 
or Legal 
Frame 
Perceived 
Costs 
Non- 
Compliant 
Minimal 
Compliance 
Full 
Compliance 
Total 
Compliance Age Gender 
Collat’l 
Consequ. 
Overall 480 39.8% 47.3% 5.18 (1.49) 6.3% 53.8% 40.0% 93.8% 
36.4 
(11.1) 48.5% 
-0.04 
(1.02) 
Fault 244 44.3% 44.3% 5.38 (1.32) 4.1% 52.5% 43.4% 95.9% 
36.6 
(11.1) 48.8% 
-0.03 
(0.97) 
No-Fault 236 35.2% 50.4% 4.97 (1.61) 8.5% 55.1% 36.4% 91.5% 
36.3 
(11.1) 48.3% 
-0.05 
(1.06) 
Strong 230 35.6% 50.0% 5.40 (1.35) 
3.9% 55.7% 40.4% 96.1% 36.4 
(11.6) 52.2% 
0.03 
(0.96) 
Weak 250 43.6% 44.8% 4.96 (1.58) 8.4% 52.0% 39.6% 91.6% 
36.5 
(10.5) 45.2% 
-0.10 
(1.06) 
Manager 241 38.2% 49.4% 5.57 (1.39) 3.7% 55.6% 40.7% 96.3% 
36.4 
(10.9) 45.2% 
-0.09 
(1.02) 
Firm 239 41.4% 45.2% 4.78 (1.48) 8.8% 51.9% 39.3% 91.2% 
36.4 
(11.2) 51.9% 
0.01 
(1.01) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel B: By Condition	  
n 
Ethical 
Frame 
Business 
or Legal 
Frame 
Perceived 
Costs 
Non- 
Compliant 
Minimal 
Compliance 
Full 
Compliance 
Total 
Compliance Age Gender 
Collat’l 
Consequ. 
Manager 
Strong 
Fault 
56 41.1% 51.8% 5.85 (1.09) 0.0% 51.8% 48.2% 100.0% 
36.9 
(11.8) 
48.2% 0.17 (0.92) 
Manager 
Weak  
Fault 
67 52.2% 40.3% 5.54 (1.39) 0.0% 50.7% 49.3% 100.0% 
37.4 
(11.7) 
37.3% -0.25 (0.98) 
Manager 
Strong 
No-Fault 
60 26.7% 56.7% 5.43 (1.55) 6.7% 60.0% 33.3% 93.3% 
35.8 
(10.5) 
43.3% -0.07 (1.01) 
Manager 
Weak     
No-Fault 
58 31.0% 50.0% 5.47 (1.45) 8.6% 60.3% 31.0% 91.4% 
35.5 
(9.6) 
53.4% -0.18 (1.11) 
Firm 
Strong 
Fault 
57 38.6% 42.1% 5.35 (1.23) 3.5% 57.9% 38.6% 96.5% 
36.3 
(10.9) 63.2% 
0.00 
(0.88) 
Firm 
Weak 
Fault 
64 43.8% 43.8% 4.81 (1.34) 12.5% 50.0% 37.5% 87.5% 
35.5 
(9.8) 48.4% 
-0.00 
(1.05) 
Firm 
Strong 
No-Fault 
57 36.8% 49.1% 5.00 (1.36) 5.3% 52.6% 42.1% 94.7% 
36.6 
(13.4) 54.4% 
0.02 
(1.03) 
Firm 
Weak 
No-Fault 
61 45.9% 45.9% 4.01 (1.65) 13.1% 47.5% 39.3% 86.9% 
37.2 
(10.7) 42.6% 
0.03 
(1.11) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Panel C: By Decision Frame 
n 
Ethical 
Frame 
Business 
or Legal 
Frame 
Perceived 
Costs 
Non-
Compliant 
Minimal 
Compliance 
Full 
Compliance 
Total 
Compliance Age Gender 
Collat’l 
Consequ 
Ethical 
Frame 191 100.0% 0.0% 
5.20 
(1.50) 1.6% 33.0% 65.4% 98.4% 
38.3 
(11.9) 45.0%
-0.25 
(0.93) 
Business or
Legal Frame 227 0.0% 100.0% 
5.16 
(1.46) 11.0% 71.4% 17.6% 90.0% 
35.8
(10.4) 52.0%
0.18 
(1.02) 
Other 62 0.0% 0.0% 5.13 (1.54) 3.2% 53.2% 43.5% 96.7% 
33.2
(9.7) 46.8%
-0.21 
(1.13) 
Panel D: By Case 
n 
Ethical 
Frame 
Business 
or Legal 
Frame 
Perceived 
Costs 
Non-
Compliant 
Minimal 
Compliance 
Full 
Compliance 
Total 
Compliance Age Gender 
Collat’l 
Consequ 
Financial 
Case 229 52.0% 39.3% 
5.20 
(1.48) 4.4% 38.4% 57.2% 95.6% 
36.2 
(11.0) 45.9%
0.11 
(0.98) 
Managerial 
Case 251 28.7% 54.6% 
5.16 
(1.49) 8.0% 67.7% 24.3% 92.0% 
36.6
(11.2) 51.0%
-0.18 
(1.03) 
FAULT is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants’ case indicates that settlements offered to violators require admission of fault, 0 when the case indicates that violators 
are neither permitted to admit nor deny fault in the settlement. STRENGTH is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when risk-weighted settlement financial penalties exceed the 
financial gains of violation (in increased profit and/or bonus pay), 0 when the financial gains of violation exceed the financial penalties imposed by settlements.  TARGET is a 
dichotomous variable set to 1 when sanctions are described as targeting the manager, or 0 when sanctions are described as targeting the manager’s firm. ETHICAL FRAME is a 
dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants indicate that their case choice is primarily an ethical choice, 0 otherwise. BUSINESS OR LEGAL FRAME is a dichotomous 
variable set to 1 when participants indicate that their case choice is primarily a business choice or primarily a legal choice, 0 otherwise. PERCEIVED COST is the average of 
participants’ responses to two 7-pt Likert questions reflecting agreement that overall costs for the firm (1) and manager (2) are high. MINIMAL COMPLIANCE is a dichotomous 
variable set to 1 when participants select either minimal disclosure, 0 when participants select no disclosure. FULL COMPLIANCE is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when 
participants select full disclosure, 0 when participants select either minimal or no disclosure. TOTAL COMPLIANCE is the sum of minimal and full compliance.  AGE is the 
number of years from 2015 (the year the data was collected) to the year that participants indicated they were born in. GENDER is a dichotomous variable set to 0 when 
participants’ self-report their gender as female, 1 when participants’ self-report their gender as male. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES is the average of participants’ decision 
weights assigned to two possible decision factors: a) possibility of subsequent litigation, b) possibility of job loss.
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TABLE 2: CORRELATION MATRIX 
Pearson’s Correlations  
Fault Target Strength 
Comply 
Level 
No 
Comply 
Minimal 
Comply 
Full 
Comply 
Ethical 
Frame 
Perceived 
Costs Gender Age 
Comply 
Level 0.099** 0.056 0.043 
No 
Comply -0.090** -0.104** -0.092** -0.585*** 
Minimal 
Comply -0.026 0.037 0.037 -0.615*** -0.278*** 
Full 
Comply 0.072* 0.014 0.009 0.916*** -0.211*** -0.880*** 
Ethical 
Frame 0.093** -0.033 -0.081* 0.413*** -0.157*** -0.339*** 0.422*** 
Perceived 
Costs 0.137*** 0.265*** 0.148*** 0.191*** -0.280*** 0.043 0.094** 0.016 
Gender 0.005 -0.067 0.070 -0.080* 0.094** 0.006 -0.053 -0.057 -0.130*** 
Age 0.012 0.002 -0.003 0.134*** -0.113** -0.047 0.103** 0.135*** 0.060 -0.033 
Collateral 
Conseq. 
0.011 -0.051 0.064 -0.139*** 0.092** 0.072 -0.119*** -0.168*** 0.078* 0.060 -0.144*** 
***, **, * - indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05,and  0.10, levels, respectively 
FAULT is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants’ case indicates that settlements offered to violators require admission of fault, 0 when the case indicates 
that violators are neither permitted to admit nor deny fault in the settlement. STRENGTH is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when risk-weighted settlement financial penalties 
exceed the financial gains of violation (in increased profit and/or bonus pay), 0 when the financial gains of violation exceed the financial penalties imposed by settlements.  
TARGET is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when sanctions are described as targeting the manager, or 0 when sanctions are described as targeting the manager’s firm. ETHICAL 
FRAME is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants indicate that their case choice is primarily an ethical choice, 0 otherwise. BUSINESS OR LEGAL FRAME is a 
dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants indicate that their case choice is primarily a business choice or primarily a legal choice, 0 otherwise. PERCEIVED COST is the 
average of participants’ responses to two 7-pt Likert questions reflecting agreement that overall costs for the firm (1) and manager (2) are high. MINIMAL COMPLIANCE is a 
dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants select either minimal disclosure, 0 when participants select no disclosure. FULL COMPLIANCE is a dichotomous variable set to 
1 when participants select full disclosure, 0 when participants select either minimal or no disclosure. TOTAL COMPLIANCE is the sum of minimal and full compliance.  AGE is 
the number of years from 2015 (the year the data was collected) to the year that participants indicated they were born in. COMPLY LEVEL is an ordinal variable set to 0 for 
participants who do not comply with regulations, 1 for participants who minimally comply, and 2 for participants who select full compliance. GENDER is a dichotomous variable 
set to 0 when participants’ self-report their gender as female, 1 when participants’ self-report their gender as male. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES is the average of 
participants’ decision weights assigned to two possible decision factors: a) possibility of subsequent litigation, b) possibility of job loss.
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Panel D of Table 1 reports compliance choices by the managerial or financial case 
scenario. 52.0% of participants completing the financial case indicate that the scenario is 
ethical in nature, while 28.7% of participants completing the managerial case do so. 95.6% 
of participants completing the financial scenario comply at some level (38.4% select 
minimal compliance, 57.2% select full compliance). 92.0% of participants completing the 
managerial scenario select either minimal or full compliance (67.7% select minimal 
compliance, 24.3% select full compliance). Because compliance level differs by case (z-
score: 4.86, p-value: <0.01), I include a control variable for case in my analysis. 
Table 2 presents Pearson’s correlations for the primary independent, dependent 
and control measures used in the study.  All three primary independent variables are 
positively associated with measures of managers’ cost perceptions (fault r = 0.137, p < 
0.01; target r = 0.265, p < 0.01; strength r = 0.148, p = 0.01).  However, only two 
independent variables are associated with managers’ ethical decision frames – (fault r = 
0.093, p = 0.04; strength r = -0.081, p = 0.08). 
Measures of managers’ cost perceptions and ethical decision frames show no 
univariate association with one another (r = 0.016, p = 0.73).  Measures of managers’ cost 
perceptions and ethical decision frames are each positively correlated with managers’ 
compliance level (ethical frame r = 0.413, p < 0.01; cost perceptions r = 0.191, p < 0.01) 
and compliance frequency (ethical frame r = 0.157, p < 0.01; cost perceptions r = -0.280, 
p < 0.01).  Lastly, control variables correlate with both mediating variables (managers’ 
ethical decision frame and cost perceptions) and compliance choices (compliance 
frequency and compliance level), but demonstrate no correlation with my independent 
variables. 
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IV.C Hypothesis Tests
The Effects of Fault on Perceived Costs (H1a) and Ethical Frames (H1b) 
Hypothesis 1a predicts that managers will perceive the costs of accepting a 
settlement to be greater when settlements include fault assignment.  I test H1a by 
examining the coefficient on fault in an OLS regression with managers’ perceived costs as 
the primary dependent variable, indicator variables for my primary independent variables 
(fault, strength, target) and their interactions, and control variables for participants’ self-
reported gender, perceived collateral consequences, and received case as described in 
Section III.   
Results are reported in Table 3, Model 1.  Consistent with H1a, the coefficient on 
fault is positively and significantly associated with my measure of cost perceptions (t-stat: 
3.37, p-value: < 0.01).16  I conclude that H1a is supported, suggesting that managers 
perceive the costs of accepting a settlement to be greater when settlements include fault 
assignment.  
Hypothesis 1b predicts that managers will be more likely to invoke ethical decision 
frames when settlements include fault assignment.  I test H1b by examining the coefficient 
on fault in a logistic regression with managers’ ethical frame as the primary dependent 
variable, indicator variables for my primary independent variables (fault, strength, target) 
and their interactions, and control variables for participants’ self-reported gender, 
perceived collateral consequences, and received case as described in Section III.  Results 
are reported in Table 4, Model 1.  Inconsistent with H1b, the coefficient on fault is not 
significantly associated with greater frequencies of ethical decision frames (z-score: -0.17, 
p-value: 0.86).  I conclude that H1b is not supported. 
16 All reported p-values are one-tailed, except where noted otherwise. 
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The Effects of Sanction Strength on Perceived Costs and Ethical Frames (RQ1) 
Research Question 1 investigates the possibility that sanction strength may influence 
managers’ ethical perceptions by signaling either/both of managers’ descriptive norms for 
non-compliance or/and regulators’ injunctive norms of compliance.  I test RQ1 by 
examining the coefficient on strength in a logistic regression with managers’ ethical frame 
as the primary dependent variable, indicator variables for my primary independent 
variables (fault, strength, target) and their interactions, and control variables for 
participants’ self-reported gender, perceived collateral consequences, and received case as 
described in Section III.  Results are reported in Table 4, Model 1.  The coefficient on 
strength is not significantly associated with greater frequencies of ethical decision frames 
(z-score: -1.18, p-value: 0.24).  I conclude that the association between sanction strength 
and managers’ ethical decision frames is not statistically significant.   
The Effects of Sanction Target on Perceived Costs (H2a) and Ethical Frames (H2b) 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that managers will perceive the costs of accepting a settlement to 
be greater when settlements target managers.  I test H2a by examining the coefficient on 
target in an OLS regression with managers’ perceived costs as the primary dependent 
variable, indicator variables for my primary independent variables (fault, strength, target) 
and their interactions, and control variables for participants’ self- reported gender, 
perceived collateral consequences, and received case as described in Section III.  Results 
are reported in Table 3, Model 1.  Consistent with H2a, the coefficient on target is 
positively and significantly associated with greater cost perceptions (t-stat: 6.08, p-value: 
< 0.01).  I conclude that H2a is supported, suggesting that managers perceive the costs of 
accepting a settlement to be greater when settlements target managers rather than firms. 
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TABLE 3:  MEDIATOR – COST PERCEPTIONS (“PROCESSING”)  
Coefficient (OLS) or Odds Ratio (Logistic / Ordered Logistic) 
 (t-stat or z-score) 
Link 1 Links 2 & 5 Links 2 & 5 
Perceived 
Costs 
(1) OLS 
Total 
Comply§
(2) LOGIT 
Comply 
Level 
(3) OLOGIT 
Perceived Costs 1.96*** (4.78) 
1.34*** 
(4.02) 
Fault (H1a) 0.83*** (3.37) 
0.50 
(-1.14) 
0.77 
(-0.68) 
Strength 1.05*** (4.11) 
1.28 
(0.32) 
1.01 
(0.03) 
Target (H2a) 1.54*** (6.08) 
0.54 
(-0.88) 
0.54* 
(-1.52) 
Target*Fault -0.83*** (-2.36) 
13.10** 
(1.94) 
2.89** 
(1.96) 
Target*Strength (H4) -1.15*** (-3.20) 
1.04 
(0.04) 
1.25 
(0.41) 
Fault*Strength (H5) -0.44 (-1.23) 
2.33 
(0.75) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
Fault*Target*Strength 0.84** (1.67) 
0.21 
(-0.79) 
0.86 
(-0.19) 
Gender -0.43*** (-3.38) 
0.76 
(-0.65) 
0.95 
(-0.28) 
Collateral 
Consequences 
0.15** 
(2.26) 
0.54*** 
(-2.86) 
0.61*** 
(-4.69) 
Case -0.03 (-0.22) 
2.75** 
(2.27) 
4.68*** 
(7.51) 
n 480 480 480 
Adj. or Pseudo R-Square 0.141 0.210 0.117 
***, **, * - indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05,and  0.10, levels, respectively 
§ - Managers in manager-targeted, assigned-fault conditions demonstrate 100% compliance.  To facilitate data
analysis, bootstrapping is conducted where observations were randomly assigned non-compliance.  2 observations were 
assigned non-compliance per iteration, 1 weak-sanction, manager-targeted, assigned fault observation and 1 strong-
sanction, manager-targeted, assigned-fault observation. 
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TABLE 4:  MEDIATOR – DECISION FRAME (“SIGNALING”) 
Odds Ratio 
 (z-score) 
Link 3 Links 4 & 5 Links 4 & 5 
Ethical 
Frame 
(1) LOGIT 
Total 
Comply§
(2) LOGIT 
Comply 
Level 
(3) OLOGIT 
Ethical Frame 4.39*** (2.60) 
5.07*** 
(7.45) 
Fault (H1b) 0.94 (-0.17) 
1.08 
(0.16) 
1.03 
(0.09) 
Strength (RQ1) 0.63 (-1.18) 
3.22* 
(1.61) 
1.74* 
(1.38) 
Target (H2b) 0.46** (-1.92) 
2.05 
(1.15) 
1.16 
(0.36) 
Target*Fault (H3) 2.57** (1.71) 
4.27 
(1.16) 
1.65 
(0.91) 
Target*Strength 1.39 (0.56) 
0.41 
(-0.87) 
0.72 
(-0.58) 
Fault*Strength 1.11 (0.19) 
1.53 
(0.39) 
0.82 
(-0.36) 
Fault*Target*Strength 0.80 (-0.28) 
0.52 
(-0.34) 
1.33 
(0.36) 
Gender 0.89 (-0.58) 
0.56* 
(-1.47) 
0.85 
(-0.79) 
Collateral 
Consequences 
0.61*** 
(-4.50) 
0.81 
(-1.15) 
0.73*** 
(-2.86) 
Case 3.24*** (5.67) 
1.68 
(1.23) 
3.49*** 
(5.89) 
n 480 480 480 
Pseudo R-Square 0.095 0.140 0.168 
***, **, * - indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05,and 0.10, levels, respectively 
FAULT is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in assigned fault conditions, 0 for participants in no-fault 
conditions. TARGET is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in manager-targeted sanction conditions, or 0 
for participants in firm-targeted sanction conditions. STRENGTH is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in 
conditions where the risk-weighted settlement financial penalties exceed the financial gains of violation (in increased 
bonus pay), 0 when otherwise.  PERCEIVED COST is the average of participants’ responses to two 7-pt Likert questions 
reflecting agreement that overall costs for the firm (1) and manager (2) are high.  ETHICAL FRAME is a dichotomous 
variable set to 1 when participants indicate the case choice is an ethical choice, 0 otherwise.  TOTAL COMPLY is a 
dichotomous variable set to 1 if the participant selected either minimal or full compliance, 0 otherwise. COMPLY 
LEVEL is an ordinal variable set to 0 for participants who do not comply with regulations, 1 for participants who select 
minimal compliance, and 2 for participants who select full compliance. GENDER is a dichotomous variable set to 0 
when participants self-report their gender as female, 1 when participants self-report their gender as male.  
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES is the average of participants’ decision weights assigned to two possible decision 
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factors: a) possibility of subsequent litigation, b) possibility of job loss. CASE is an indicator variable set to 1 for 
participants who completed the financial scenario. 
Hypothesis 2b predicts that managers will be more likely to invoke ethical decision 
frames when settlements target firms rather than managers.  I test H2b by examining the 
coefficient on target in a logistic regression with managers’ ethical frame as the primary 
dependent variable, indicator variables for my primary independent variables (fault, 
strength, target) and their interactions, and control variables for participants’ self-reported 
gender, perceived collateral consequences, and received case as described in Section III.  
Results are reported in Table 4, Model 1.  Consistent with H2b, the coefficient on target is 
negative and statistically significant (z-score: -1.92, p-value: 0.06).  I conclude that H2b is 
supported, suggesting that managers are more likely to invoke ethical decision frames 
when sanctions target the firm than when they target managers. 
The Interactive Effects of Fault and Sanction Target on Ethical Frames (H3) 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the effects of fault assignment and sanction target on 
managers’ ethical decision frames will be greater in combination than alone.  I test H3 by 
examining the coefficient on target*fault in a logistic regression with managers’ ethical 
frame as the primary dependent variable, indicator variables for my primary independent 
variables (fault, strength, target) and their interactions, and control variables for 
participants’ self-reported gender, perceived collateral consequences, and received case as 
described in Section III.  Results are reported in Table 4, Model 1.  Consistent with H3, 
the coefficient on target*fault is positive and weakly statistically significant (z-score: 1.71, 
p-value: 0.09).  I conclude that H3 is supported, suggesting that managers are more likely 
to invoke ethical decision frames when sanctions target managers with fault. 
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The Interactive Effects of Sanction Strength and Sanction Target on Perceived Costs 
(H4) 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that managers’ cost perceptions will be more sensitive to 
differences in sanction strength when settlements target managers.  I test H4 by examining 
the coefficient on target*strength in an OLS regression with managers’ perceived costs as 
the primary dependent variable, indicator variables for my primary independent variables 
(fault, strength, target) and their interactions, and control variables for participants’ self-
reported gender, perceived collateral consequences, and received case as described in 
Section III.  Results are reported in Table 3, Model 1.  Inconsistent with H4, the 
coefficient on target*strength is negatively and significantly associated with my measure 
of cost perceptions (t-stat: -3.20, p-value: < 0.01).  One interpretation of this finding is that 
sanction strength and sanction target may act as partial substitutes with regards to 
managers’ cost perceptions.  In light of the negative and statistically significant coefficient 
on target*fault, an alternative interpretation of this finding is that managers’ cost 
perceptions are non-linear, resulting in decreasing marginal benefits for adding additional 
costs to sanctions. 
The Interactive Effects of Fault and Sanction Strength on Perceived Costs (H5) 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the cost perceptions triggered by assigning fault in 
sanctions will substitute for cost perceptions triggered by strong sanctions.  I test H5 by 
examining the coefficient on fault*strength in an OLS regression with managers’ cost 
perceptions as the primary dependent variable, indicator variables for my primary 
independent variables (fault, strength, target) and their interactions, and control variables 
for participants’ self-reported gender, perceived collateral consequences, and received 
41 
case as described in Section III.  Results are reported in Table 3, Model 1.  Inconsistent 
with H5, the coefficient on fault*strength is not statistically significantly related to 
managers cost perceptions (t-stat: -1.23, p-value: 0.22).  I conclude that H5 is not 
supported.   
The Effects of Perceived Costs and Ethical Frames on Managers’ Compliance 
Frequency (H6a) and Compliance Level (H6b) 
Hypothesis 6a predicts that managers cost perceptions and ethical perceptions will 
be associated with greater frequencies of compliance. I test H6a by examining the 
coefficients on perceived costs and ethical frame in a logistic regression with total 
compliance as the primary dependent variable.  I include measures of my mediating 
variables perceived costs and ethical frame, and also include controls for my manipulated 
variables (fault, strength, target) and their interactions.  Lastly, I also control for 
participants’ self-reported gender, perceived collateral consequences, and received case as 
described in Section III.  Results are reported in Table 5, Panel B Model 1.  Consistent 
with H6a, the coefficient on perceived costs is positive and statistically significant (z-
score: 4.55, p-value: < 0.01); the coefficient on ethical frame is also positive and 
statistically significant (z-score: 2.30, p-value: 0.02).  I conclude that H6a is supported, 
suggesting that managers are more likely to select at least minimum compliance when 
they perceive costs to be greater and when they perceive their compliance choice to be 
ethical in nature. 
Hypothesis 6b predicts that managers cost perceptions and ethical perceptions will 
be associated with greater levels of compliance. I test H6b by examining the coefficients 
on perceived costs and ethical frame in an ordered logistic regression with compliance  
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TABLE 5: FULL MODEL 
Panel A:  Without Mediators 
Odds Ratio 
(z-score) 
 
All Links All Links 
Total 
Comply§
(1) LOGIT 
Comply 
Level 
(2) OLOGIT 
Fault 1.08 (0.15) 
0.96 
(-0.10) 
Strength 2.92* (1.50) 
1.30 
(0.67) 
Target 1.71 (0.87) 
0.84 
(-0.45) 
Target*Fault 4.92* (1.28) 
2.20* 
(1.48) 
Target*Strength 0.43 (-0.83) 
0.90 
(-0.18) 
Fault*Strength 1.38 (0.30) 
0.91 
(-0.18) 
Fault*Target*Strength 0.59 (-0.27) 
1.13 
(0.16) 
Gender 0.56* (-1.49) 
0.85 
(-0.83) 
Collateral Consequences 0.71** (-1.84) 
0.64*** 
(-4.31) 
Case 2.20** (1.93) 
4.43*** 
(7.35) 
n 480 480 
Pseudo R-Square 0.103 0.097 
***, **, * - indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05,and  0.10, levels, respectively 
§ - Managers in manager-targeted, assigned-fault conditions demonstrate 100% compliance.  To facilitate data
analysis, bootstrapping is conducted where observations were randomly assigned non-compliance.  2 observations were 
assigned non-compliance per iteration, 1 weak-sanction, manager-targeted, assigned fault observation and 1 strong-
sanction, manager-targeted, assigned-fault observation. 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Panel B:  With Mediators 
Odds Ratio 
 (z-score) 
All Links All Links 
Comply 
Level, 
Comply 
Level, 
Total 
Comply§
(1) LOGIT 
Comply 
Level 
(2) OLOGIT 
Ethical 
Frame 
(3) OLOGIT 
Econ/Legal 
Frame 
 (4) OLOGIT 
Perceived Costs (H6) 1.91*** (4.55) 
1.36*** 
(4.06) 
1.18 
(1.23) 
1.73*** 
(4.43) 
Ethical Frame (H6) 3.84** (2.30) 
5.22*** 
(7.46) 
Fault 0.55 (-0.95) 
0.81 
(-0.55) 
1.05 
(0.07) 
0.61 
(-0.80) 
Strength 1.48 (0.50) 
1.31 
(0.66) 
0.54 
(-0.86) 
2.87* 
(1.63) 
Target 0.67 (-0.55) 
0.72 
(-0.77) 
0.63 
(-0.57) 
1.06 
(0.10) 
Target*Fault 9.60** (1.70) 
2.20* 
(1.40) 
1.11 
(0.10) 
4.20* 
(1.62) 
Target*Strength 0.97 (-0.03) 
1.02 
(0.04) 
1.81 
(0.52) 
0.23** 
(-1.64) 
Fault*Strength 2.37 (0.75) 
0.94 
(-0.10) 
0.52 
(-0.67) 
0.84 
(-0.19) 
Fault*Target* 
Strength 
0.20 
(-0.79) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
2.34 
(0.56) 
2.30 
(0.67) 
Gender 0.75 (-0.67) 
0.95 
(-0.23) 
1.32 
(0.74) 
0.56** 
(-1.77) 
Collateral 
Consequences 
0.63** 
(-2.15) 
0.70*** 
(-3.24) 
0.71* 
(-1.55) 
0.77** 
(-1.64) 
Case 2.11* (1.64) 
3.68*** 
(6.07) 
13.47*** 
(6.47) 
3.24*** 
(3.51) 
n 480 480 191 227 
Pseudo R-Square 0.238 0.189 0.209 0.208 
***, **, * - indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05,and  0.10, levels, respectively 
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PERCEIVED COSTS is the average of participants’ responses to two 7-pt Likert questions reflecting agreement that 
overall costs for the firm (1) and manager (2) are high. ETHICAL FRAME is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when 
participants indicate the case choice is an ethical choice, 0 otherwise.  FAULT is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for 
participants in assigned fault conditions, 0 for participants in no-fault conditions. TARGET is a dichotomous variable 
set to 1 for participants in manager-targeted sanction conditions, or 0 for participants in firm-targeted sanction 
conditions. STRENGTH is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in conditions where the risk-weighted 
settlement financial penalties exceed the financial gains of violation (in increased bonus pay), 0 when otherwise.  
TOTAL COMPLY is a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the participant selected either minimal or full compliance, 0 
otherwise. COMPLY LEVEL is an ordinal variable set to 0 for participants who do not comply with regulations, 1 for 
participants who select minimal compliance, and 2 for participants who select full compliance. GENDER is a 
dichotomous variable set to 0 when participants self-report their gender as female, 1 when participants self-report their 
gender as male.  COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES is the average of participants’ decision weights assigned to two 
possible decision factors: a) possibility of subsequent litigation, b) possibility of job loss. CASE is an indicator variable 
set to 1 for participants who completed the financial scenario. 
level as the primary dependent variable.  I include measures of my mediating 
variables perceived costs and ethical frame, and also include controls for my manipulated 
variables and participants’ self-reported gender, perceived collateral consequences, and 
received case as described in Section III.  Results are reported in Table 5, Panel B Model 
2. Consistent with H6b, the coefficient on perceived costs is positive and statistically
significant (z-score: 4.06, p-value: <0.01); the coefficient on ethical frame is also positive 
and statistically significant (z-score: 7.46, p-value: <0.01).  I conclude that H6b is 
supported, suggesting that managers select higher quality compliance both when they 
perceive costs to be greater and when they perceive their compliance choice to be ethical 
in nature. 
Lastly, in ordered logistic regressions on subsamples of participants indicating 
ethical decision frames (Table 5, Panel B Model 3) or economic/legal decision frames 
(Table 5, Panel B Model 4) I additionally observe that perceived costs is only a 
determinant of compliance level among participants adopting economic/legal decision 
frames (z-score: 4.43, p-value: <0.01), but not among participants adopting ethical 
decision frames (z-score: 1.23, p-value: 0.22).  This is consistent with theory regarding 
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decision frames, which predicts that managers’ cost perceptions are not emphasized by 
individuals adopting ethical decision frames (Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). 
IV.D SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS 
‘Dark Triad’ Personality Traits 
 Prior research suggests that the senior-most managers most likely to have decision 
responsibility for compliance choices demonstrate high levels of dark triad personality 
traits associated with self-interested choice (O’Reilly et al. 2014). I therefore investigate 
the sensitivity of my findings to subsamples of participants who demonstrate either high 
levels of dark triad personality traits (‘high triads’) or low levels of dark triad personality 
traits (‘low triads’).  Arguments hold alternatively that high triads, who may be less 
sensitive to others’ concerns, will also be less concerned with avoiding social penalties 
such as fault assignment.  Or, alternatively that high triads – who tend to be more 
narcissistic – may be more rather than less concerned with reputational signals that 
threaten self-image, such as fault assignment.  Similarly, it may also be that low triads are 
less sensitive to social cues in the sense that their compliance is consistently high, even 
without fault.   
To investigate the sensitivity of my results to high or low levels of dark triad 
personality traits, I partition my sample based on the standardized average of participants’ 
scores to three psychometric scales measuring machiavellianism (Mach-IV scale, Christie 
& Geiss 1970), narcissism (NPI scale, Raskin & Hall 1981), and descriptive statistics for 
participants’ ethical decision frames and compliance by dark triad partition.  Descriptive 
statistics are directionally consistent with the high triad subsample being both less likely to 
perceive compliance as an ethical choice (32.0% for high triads, 47.0% for low triads) and 
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less likely to comply with regulation (10.8% of high triads do not comply, 2.0% of low 
triads do not comply). 
In subsamples of high triad and low triad participants I examine the effects of 
sanction attributes on managers’ perceived costs (Table 6, Panel B Models 1 and 2), 
ethical decision frames (Table 6, Panel B Models 3 and 4), and compliance level (Table 6, 
Panel B Models 5 and 6). In an OLS regression with perceived cost as the primary 
dependent variable, specified as in Table 3 Model 1, I observe that interactions of sanction 
attributes are generally statistically significant for low triad participants (Table 6, Panel B 
Model 2 target*fault t-stat: -2.24, p-value: 0.03; target*strength t-stat: -2.75, p-value: 0.01; 
fault*strength t-stat: -1.29, p-value: 0.20; fault*target*strength t-stat: 2.05, p-value: 0.04) 
but not significant for high triad participants (Table 6, Panel B Model 1target*fault t-stat: -
1.17, p-value: 0.24; target*strength t-stat: -1.71, p-value: 0.09; fault*strength t-stat: -0.44, 
p-value: 0.66; fault*target*strength t-stat: 0.29, p-value: 0.77).  This suggests that high 
triads perceive less cost substitution from sanction attributes than do low triads, which 
may partly reflect less non-linearity in their perceived cost function. In a logistic 
regression with ethical frame as the primary dependent variable, specified as in Table 4 
Model 1, I observe that coefficients on target and target*fault are statistically significant 
determinants among high triads (Table 6, Panel B Model 3 target z-score: - 2.52, p-value: 
0.01; target*fault z-score: 2.31, p-value: 0.02) but not among low triads  (Table 6, Panel B 
Model 4 target z-score: -0.21, p-value: 0.83; target*fault z-score: -0.29, p-value: 0.78).   
Lastly, in an logistic regression with compliance level as the primary dependent 
variable, specified as in Table 5 Panel B Model 2, I observe that coefficients on perceived 
costs and target*fault are statistically significant determinants among high triads (Table 6, 
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TABLE 6: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: BY DARK TRIAD PARTITION 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics By Dark Triad Partition 
 
 
 
n 
Ethical 
Frame 
Business 
or Legal 
Frame 
Perceived 
Costs 
Non-
Compliant 
Minimal 
Comply 
Full 
Comply 
Total 
Comply 
High 
Triad 231 32.0% 56.7% 
5.15 
(1.56) 10.8% 56.3% 32.9% 89.2% 
Low 
Triad 249 47.0% 38.6% 
5.20 
(1.42) 2.0% 51.4% 46.6% 98.0% 
 
Panel B:  Mediating Variables (Processing, Signaling), by Triad Partition 
Coefficient (OLS) or Odds Ratio (Logistic and Ordered Logistic) 
(t-stat or z-score) 
 Perceived Costs 
High Triad 
 (1) OLS 
Perceived Costs 
Low Triad 
 (2) OLS 
Ethical Frame 
High Triad 
 (3) LOGIT 
Ethical Frame 
Low Triad 
 (4) LOGIT 
Fault 0.82*** (2.18) 
0.86*** 
(2.64) 
0.52 
(-1.20) 
2.02 
(1.26) 
Strength 1.11*** (2.90) 
1.03*** 
(2.97) 
0.57 
(-0.99) 
0.69 
(-0.64) 
Target 1.49*** (3.70) 
1.59*** 
(4.86) 
0.17*** 
(-2.52) 
0.89 
(-0.21) 
Target*Fault -0.64 (-1.17) 
-1.04** 
(-2.24) 
7.96** 
(2.31) 
0.87 
(-0.19) 
Target*Strength  -0.96** (-1.71) 
-1.31*** 
(-2.75) 
2.99 
(1.14) 
0.80 
(-0.29) 
Fault*Strength  -0.24 (-0.44) 
-0.63* 
(-1.29) 
0.86 
(-0.18) 
1.00 
(-0.00) 
Fault*Target* 
Strength 
0.22 
(0.29) 
1.40** 
(2.05) 
0.92 
(-0.07) 
-0.17 
(-0.14) 
Gender -0.61*** (-3.02) 
-0.30** 
(-1.74) 
0.84 
(-0.56) 
1.11 
(0.36) 
Collateral 
Consequences  
0.16* 
(1.62) 
0.13* 
(1.47) 
0.70** 
(-2.16) 
0.51*** 
(-4.14) 
Case -0.13 (-0.65) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
3.14*** 
(3.56) 
4.92*** 
(5.12) 
n 231 249 231 249 
Adj. / Pseudo R-
Square 0.130 0.126 0.097 0.145 
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Panel C: Dependent Variable (Compliance), by Triad Partition 
Coefficient 
(z-score) 
Comply Level 
High Triad 
 (1) OLOGIT 
Comply Level 
Low Triad 
 (2) OLOGIT 
Perceived Costs 1.64*** (4.65) 
1.09 
(0.77) 
Ethical Frame 6.52*** (5.46) 
3.33*** 
(3.89) 
Fault 0.68 (-0.70) 
1.30 
(0.45) 
Strength 1.29 (0.41) 
1.44 
(0.59) 
Target 0.47 (-1.20) 
1.22 
(0.34) 
Target*Fault 2.98* (1.33) 
1.18 
(0.21) 
Target*Strength 0.94 (-0.07) 
0.84 
(-0.21) 
Fault*Strength 0.89 (-0.15) 
0.81 
(-0.25) 
Fault*Target* 
Strength 
1.46 
(0.33) 
1.10 
(0.08) 
Gender 1.10 (0.32) 
1.03 
(0.11) 
Collateral 
Consequences 
0.75** 
(-1.89) 
0.62*** 
(-2.84) 
Case 2.95*** (3.50) 
6.41*** 
(5.65) 
n 231 249 
Pseudo R-Square 0.204 0.208 
***, **, * - indicates statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively 
TRIAD partitions sample based on their averaged and standardized score to3 psychometric scales, as described in 
Section V. HIGH TRIAD contains participants with above-median dark triad scores; LOW TRIAD contains participants 
with below-median dark triad scores.  FAULT is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in assigned fault 
conditions, 0 for participants in no-fault conditions. TARGET is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in 
manager-targeted sanction conditions, or 0 for participants in firm-targeted sanction conditions. STRENGTH is a 
dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in conditions where the risk-weighted settlement financial penalties 
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exceed the financial gains of violation (in increased bonus pay), 0 when otherwise.  ETHICAL FRAME is a dichotomous 
variable set to 1 when participants indicate the case choice is an ethical choice, 0 otherwise. PERCEIVED COST is the 
average of participants’ responses to two 7-pt Likert questions reflecting agreement that overall costs for the firm (1) 
and manager (2) are high. TOTAL COMPLY is a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the participant selected either minimal 
or full compliance, 0 otherwise.   COMPLY LEVEL is an ordinal variable set to 0 for participants who do not comply 
with regulations, 1 for participants who select minimal compliance, and 2 for participants who select full compliance. 
GENDER is a dichotomous variable set to 0 when participants self-report their gender as female, 1 when participants 
self-report their gender as male.  COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES is the average of participants’ decision weights 
assigned to two possible decision factors: a) possibility of subsequent litigation, b) possibility of job loss. CASE is an 
indicator variable set to 1 for participants who completed the financial scenario. 
Panel C Model 1 perceived costs z-score: 4.65, p-value: <0.01; target*fault z-score: 1.33, 
p-value: 0.18) but not among low triads (Table 6, Panel B Model 4 perceived costs z-
score: 0.77, p-value: 0.44; target*fault z-score: 0.21, p-value: 0.84).  These findings are 
consistent with the observed effects of sanction attributes (e.g., fault, sanction strength, 
sanction target) being more pronounced in the high triad subsample than the low triad 
subsample. 
Cost Source and Compliance Level 
Although much of the policy debate regarding sanction strength focuses on the 
magnitude of financial penalties imposed in sanctions, sociology and criminology research 
suggests that social motivations are at least as important in motivating compliance (Pratt 
& Cullen 2005). I therefore decompose managers’ cost perceptions into their economic 
and social cost bases, investigating whether the source of managers’ cost perceptions 
(economic versus social) are differently associated managers’ compliance frequency and 
compliance level.  In Table 7 I employ logistic regressions of managers’ minimal 
compliance (Table 8, Model 1), full compliance (Table 7, Model 2), total compliance 
(Table 7, Model 3), and compliance level (Table 7, Model 4 – ordered logistic) as the 
primary dependent variable.  Models are specified as in Table 5, Panel B, with managers’ 
perceived costs and ethical frame as mediating variables in regressions that include 
controls for manipulated variables and their interactions and for gender, collateral 
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consequences and case.   However, in the present analysis I replace managers’ perceived 
costs with two variables, reflecting managers’ perceived economic costs, and perceived 
social costs (see Section III, Manipulation Check for exact language). 
 I observe that the coefficient on perceived economic costs is positively and 
statistically significantly related to minimal compliance (z-score: 2.66, p-value: 0.01) and 
total compliance (z-score: 2.52, p-value: 0.01), but negatively related to full compliance 
(z-score: -1.31, p-value: 0.19), and not related to compliance level (z-score: -0.17, p-value: 
0.86).  This suggests that managers’ perceptions of economic costs may increase overall 
compliance, but does so in part by reducing the prevalence of high quality compliance.  I 
observe that the coefficient on perceived social costs is positive and statistically 
significantly related to full compliance (z-score: 3.95, p-value: <0.01), total compliance (z-
score: 2.38, p-value: 0.02), and compliance level (z-score: 4.89, p-value: < 0.01).  
However, perceived social costs are negatively and statistically significantly related to 
minimal compliance (z-score: -2.29, p-value: 0.02).   This is consistent with a positive 
association between perceived social costs and both the frequency and the quality of 
compliance.  
Pairwise Comparisons of Regulatory Regimes 
 Regulators may be constrained in their ability to advocate for changes to existing 
regulatory regimes because regimes are path dependent with institutional changes 
requiring advocacy, political capital, and career risk.  Consequently, regulators may be  
interested in better understanding which ‘regulatory lever(s)’ is/are most likely to yield 
increases in compliance for any given initial regulatory state.  In Table 8, I report the 
results of pairwise comparisons of regulatory regimes that differ by one attribute, to  
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TABLE 7:  SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS:  SOURCE OF PERCEIVED COSTS   
Odds Ratio 
 (z-score) 
 Minimal 
Comply 
(1) LOGIT 
Full 
Comply 
(2) LOGIT 
Total 
Comply§ 
(3) LOGIT 
Comply 
Level 
(4) OLOGIT 
Perceived 
Economic Costs 
1.32*** 
(2.66) 
0.86* 
(-1.31) 
1.74*** 
(2.52) 
0.98 
(-0.17) 
Perceived Social 
Costs 
0.78** 
(-2.29) 
1.62*** 
(3.95) 
1.65*** 
(2.38) 
1.73*** 
(4.89) 
Ethical Frame 0.29*** (-5.70) 
4.93*** 
(3.95) 
4.09*** 
(2.35) 
5.32*** 
(7.41) 
Fault 1.07 
(0.17) 
0.71 
(-0.76) 
0.38* 
(-1.42) 
0.69 
(-0.94) 
Strength 1.07 (0.13) 
1.04 
(0.11) 
0.60 
(-0.11) 
1.20 
(0.44) 
Target 1.49 (0.97) 
0.68 
(-0.82) 
1.32 
(0.39) 
0.89 
(-0.28) 
Target*Fault 0.76 (-0.47) 
2.59* 
(1.50) 
12.80** 
(1.87) 
3.14** 
(1.98) 
Target*Strength 0.76 (-0.44) 
1.31 
(0.41) 
1.30 
(0.24) 
1.05 
(0.09) 
Fault*Strength 1.33 (0.52) 
0.97 
(-0.06) 
5.84* 
(1.40) 
1.15 
(0.24) 
Fault*Target* 
Strength 
0.80 
(-0.30) 
0.86 
(0-.17) 
0.12 
(-0.99) 
0.71 
(-0.41) 
Gender 0.87 (-0.62) 
1.01 
(0.03) 
0.68 
(-0.85) 
0.91 
(-0.43) 
Collateral 
Consequences  
1.11 
(0.91) 
0.76*** 
(-2.21) 
0.65** 
(-1.99) 
0.72*** 
(-2.77) 
Case 0.38*** (-4.84) 
3.24*** 
(4.98) 
2.18* 
(1.62) 
2.97*** 
(4.93) 
n 480 480 480 480 
Pseudo R-Square 0.143 0.231 0.293 0.213 
 
 
***, **, * - indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05,and  0.10, levels, respectively 
 
PERCEIVED ECONOMIC COSTS is the average of participants’ responses to two 7-pt Likert questions reflecting 
agreement that accepting a settlement could damage the finances of the firm (1) and manager (2).  PERCEIVED 
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SOCIAL COSTS is the average of participants’ responses to two 7-pt Likert questions reflecting agreement that 
accepting a settlement could damage the reputation and relationships of the firm (1) and manager (2). ETHICAL 
FRAME is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants indicate the case choice is an ethical choice, 0 otherwise.  
MINIMAL COMPLIANCE is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants select either minimal disclosure, 0 when 
participants select no disclosure. FULL COMPLIANCE is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants select full 
disclosure, 0 when participants select either minimal or no disclosure.  TOTAL COMPLY is a dichotomous variable set 
to 1 if the participant selected either minimal or full compliance, 0 otherwise. COMPLY LEVEL is an ordinal variable 
set to 0 for participants who do not comply with regulations, 1 for participants who select minimal compliance, and 2 for 
participants who select full compliance. FAULT is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in assigned fault 
conditions, 0 for participants in no-fault conditions. TARGET is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in 
manager-targeted sanction conditions, or 0 for participants in firm-targeted sanction conditions. STRENGTH is a 
dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in conditions where the risk-weighted settlement financial penalties 
exceed the financial gains of violation (in increased bonus pay), 0 when otherwise.  GENDER is a dichotomous variable 
set to 0 when participants self-report their gender as female, 1 when participants self-report their gender as male.  
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES is the average of participants’ decision weights assigned to two possible decision 
factors: a) possibility of subsequent litigation, b) possibility of job loss. CASE is an indicator variable set to 1 for 
participants who completed the financial scenario. 
§ - Managers in manager-targeted, assigned-fault conditions demonstrate 100% compliance.  To facilitate data 
analysis, bootstrapping is conducted where observations were randomly assigned non-compliance.  2 observations were 
assigned non-compliance per iteration, 1 weak-sanction, manager-targeted, assigned fault observation and 1 strong-
sanction, manager-targeted, assigned-fault observation. 
 
simulate the potential benefits of pulling single ‘regulatory levers’ for initial regulatory 
states. 
 I observe that adding fault to manager-targeted regimes increases managers’ cost 
perceptions in the presence of strong sanctions (t-stat: 2.17, p-value: 0.02) and increases 
managers’ ethical frames for both weak and strong sanctions (weak sanctions z-score: 
2.04, p-value: 0.02; strong sanctions z-score: 1.90, p-value: 0.06).  This results in greater 
in greater compliance level in both conditions (weak sanctions z-score: 2.17, p-value: 
0.02; strong sanctions z-score: 2.06, p-value: 0.02), and greater compliance frequency in 
both strong and weak sanction conditions (weak sanctions z-score: 1.53, p-value: 0.06; 
strong sanctions z-score: 1.26, p-value: 0.10).  This is consistent with fault yielding 
incremental benefits to compliance in regimes that primarily target managers. 
I also observe that increasing the strength of sanctions in firm-targeted regimes 
increases managers’ cost perceptions in the presence of both fault and no-fault sanctions 
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TABLE 8:  SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: PAIRWISE COMPARISONS 
Coefficient – Compliance Level 
[ Coefficient – Compliance Frequency ] 
Add Fault 
Increase 
Strength 
Target 
Manager 
No-Fault, Weak, Firm-Targeted -0.02 
§
[ 0.09 ]
0.22 §
[1.13** ] 
-0.11 § ✪
[ 0.60 ] 
No-Fault, Weak, Manager-Targeted 0.83
**  ★
[ 1.72* ]
0.12
[ 0.15 ]
No-Fault, Strong, Firm-Targeted -0.14 
§
[ 0.19 ]
-0.28 §
[ -0.52 ]
No-Fault, Strong, Manager-Targeted 0.82
**  § ★
[ 1.46* ] 
Fault, Weak, Firm-Targeted 0.15 
§
[ 1.36* ]
0.62* §
[ 2.17** ]
Fault, Weak, Manager-Targeted 0.08 
§
[ n/a  £ ]
Fault, Strong, Firm-Targeted 0.60
* §
[ 1.06 ]
Fault, Strong, Manager-Targeted 
***, **, * - indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05,and  0.10, levels, respectively 
§ - indicates managers’ cost perceptions significantly greater at p < 0.10 level
★ - indicates managers’ ethical frames significantly greater at p < 0.10 level
✪ - indicates managers’ ethical frames significantly lower at p < 0.10 level
£ - compliance frequency was 100% for both Fault,Weak,Manager-Targeted and Fault,Strong,Manager-Targeted 
conditions 
Conditions are as described above. FAULT is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in assigned fault 
conditions, 0 for participants in no-fault conditions. TARGET is a dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in 
manager-targeted sanction conditions, or 0 for participants in firm-targeted sanction conditions. STRENGTH is a 
dichotomous variable set to 1 for participants in conditions where the risk-weighted settlement financial penalties 
exceed the financial gains of violation (in increased bonus pay), 0 when otherwise.  TOTAL COMPLY is a dichotomous 
variable set to 1 if the participant selected either minimal or full compliance, 0 otherwise. COMPLY LEVEL is an 
ordinal variable set to 0 for participants who do not comply with regulations, 1 for participants who select minimal 
compliance, and 2 for participants who select full compliance. 
Each cell represents the incremental benefit in increased compliance frequency ‘TOTAL COMPLY’ or compliance 
quality ‘COMPLY LEVEL’ that is gained from adding the sanction attribute indicated in the top row. 
 (assigned-fault t-stat: 2.17, p-value: 0.02; no-fault t-stat: 3.80, p-value: < 0.01).  However, 
increasing the strength of firm-targeted sanctions does not influence the prevalence of 
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managers’ ethical frames in a statistically significant manner (assigned-fault z-score: -
0.66, p-value: 0.27; no-fault z-score: -1.20, p-value: 0.12).  Nevertheless, increasing the 
strength of firm-targeted sanctions results in greater compliance frequencies (assigned-
fault z-score: 1.59, p-value: 0.06; no-fault z-score: 1.53, p-value: 0.07), but does not result 
in greater compliance level (assigned-fault z-score: 0.38, p-value: 0.35; no-fault z-score: 
0.56, p-value: 0.28).  This is consistent with increased sanction strength yielding 
incremental benefits to compliance in regimes that primarily target firms. 
Private Fault 
Lastly, I investigate which portion of managers’ compliance is attributable to fault 
assignment per se, in the absence of public disclosure. I employ a condition with weak 
manager-target sanctions where investigations and settlements are described as being 
private in nature. Research suggests that social concerns are generally heightened when 
social signals are made public, but persist also when kept private (Tafkov 2012, Smith et 
al. 2002). This corresponds with notions of guilt, a loss of self-respect versus shame, 
reflecting a loss of respect in the eyes of others (Smith et al. 2002, Grasmick & Bursik 
1990, Williams & Hawkins 1989).   
In Table 9, I examine the relationship between private fault and managers’ ethical 
decision frames and compliance in four comparisons.  I first examine if fault and/or 
private investigations influence the primary mediating variables, perceived costs (Table 9, 
Model 1) and ethical frame  (Table 9, Model 2).  In an OLS regression with managers’ 
perceived costs as the primary dependent variable, indicator variables for fault and private 
enforcement, and controls for gender, collateral consequences and case as discussed in 
Section IV, I find no statistically significant relationship of fault assignment or the  
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TABLE 9:  SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS – PRIVATE FAULT 
 
Coefficient (OLS) or Odds Ratio (Logistic and Ordered Logistic) 
(t-stat and z-score) 
 Perceived 
Costs 
(1) OLS 
Ethical 
Frame 
(2) LOGIT 
Comply 
Level 
(3) OLOGIT 
Comply 
Level 
(4) OLOGIT 
Perceived Costs    
1.32** 
(2.04) 
Ethical Frame    
4.88*** 
(4.37) 
Fault  -0.02 (-0.08) 
2.35** 
(2.11) 
2.24** 
(2.10) 
1.90* 
(1.57) 
Private 0.30 (1.25) 
0.83 
(-0.45) 
0.57* 
(-1.46) 
0.52* 
(-1.60) 
Gender -0.76*** (-3.88) 
0.75 
(-0.88) 
1.03 
(0.10) 
1.41 
(0.97) 
Collateral 
Consequences 
0.08 
(0.84) 
0.64*** 
(-2.54) 
0.72** 
(-2.05) 
0.79* 
(-1.37) 
Case -0.46*** (-2.37) 
3.97*** 
(4.11) 
3.42*** 
(3.81) 
2.77*** 
(2.87) 
n 177 177 177 177 
Adj. / Pseudo R-
Square 0.088 0.129 0.087 0.168 
 
NOTE: EMPLOYS ONLY MANAGER-TARGETED, WEAK SANCTIONS, WITH ASCRIBED FAULT. 
***, **, * - indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively 
FAULT is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants’ case indicates that settlements offered to violators require 
admission of fault, 0 when the case indicates that violators are neither permitted to admit nor deny fault in the 
settlement. PRIVATE is a dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants’ case indicates that settlements are privately 
recorded, known only by the regulator, 0 when the settlement (including any admission of fault) is described as being 
part of the public record, in a publicly searchable database.  MINIMAL COMPLY is a dichotomous variable set to 1 
when participants select either minimal or full disclosure, 0 when participants select no disclosure. FULL COMPLY is a 
dichotomous variable set to 1 when participants select full disclosure, 0 when participants select either minimal or no 
disclosure. PERCEIVED COSTS is the average of participants’ responses to two 7-pt Likert questions reflecting 
agreement that overall costs for the firm (1) and manager (2) are high. ETHICAL FRAME is a dichotomous variable set 
to 1 when participants indicate the case choice is an ethical choice.  ETHICAL FRAME is a dichotomous variable set to 
1 when participants indicate that their case choice is primarily an ethical choice, 0 otherwise. CASE is an indicator 
variable set to 1 for participants who completed the financial scenario. 
 
 
public/private disclosure of enforcement to managers’ perceived costs (fault t-stat: -0.08, 
p-value 0.93; private assignment t-stat: 1.25, p-value 0.21).  In a logistic regression with 
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managers’ ethical decision frame as the primary dependent variable, I find that fault 
assignment is positively and significantly associated with ethical decision frames (z-score: 
2.11, p-value 0.04), but my indicator for privately assigned fault does not load (z-score: -
0.45, p-value 0.65). This is consistent with fault assignment functioning as a social penalty 
even when privately assigned, because fault is associated with guilt, a self-mediated social 
penalty (Smith et al. 2002, Grasmick & Bursik 1990, Williams & Hawkins 1989).  
However, in ordered logistic regressions with compliance level as the primary 
dependent variable (Model 3 and Model 4, without and with mediators respectively), I 
observe that the positive effects of fault assignment (without mediators, odds-ratio: 2.24; 
with mediators, odds-ratio: 1.90) are approximately offset by the negative effects of 
private enforcement (without mediators, odds-ratio: 0.57; with mediators, odds-ratio: 
0.52).  This suggests that the increased ethical perceptions facilitated by fault may be less 
likely to translate into increased compliance without public records of enforcement. 
V. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, & FUTURE RESEARCH 
 In this study, I report the results of an experiment where individuals face a costly 
compliance choice in the presence of sanctions that may either be strong or weak, may 
target managers or firms, and may also include fault assignment. This study observes that 
individuals faced with fault assignment in manager-targeted sanctions are more likely to 
perceive their compliance as an ethical dilemma and consequently comply more 
frequently and at a higher level than managers faced with no-fault sanctions. Thus, fault 
conditionally demonstrates a relationship to managers’ compliance and ethical 
perceptions, and – ultimately – to their compliance. 
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These findings compliment recent research investigating the complex interactions 
effects of sanctioning systems with compliance (Tayler & Bloomfield 2011, Gneezy & 
Rustichini 2000, Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999). While several studies find that sanctions 
crowd-out cooperation and social concerns, my findings suggest that fault fosters ethical 
decision frames in the presence of sanctions. One interpretation of my evidence is that 
sanctions may include both economic and social dimensions, with social sanctions such as 
fault tending to reinforce ethical decision frames.  Prior studies that examined the effects 
of economic sanctions typically did so in the absence of social sanctions (Tayler & 
Bloomfield 2011, Gneezy & Rustichini 2000, Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999), which may be 
operative in many compliance decisions. Lastly, my study also allows for participants to 
exceed minimal levels of compliance, finding that the compliance associated with 
economic decision frames differs from the compliance associated with ethical decision 
frames. This contributes to discussions of compliance and discussing ‘letter of the law’ 
compliance. 
This study is subject to several limitations meriting discussion. Because I employ 
experimental methods, I am able to test for directions of effects but am unable to estimate 
the sanction levels that would be appropriate for use in practice (e.g. the sanction level that 
would offset decreases in voluntary compliance caused by removing fault).  Likewise, 
because participants in my study make compliance choices without putting actual 
economic resources at risk, my study is limited in its ability to inform  the potential 
consequences of policies that do impose actual economic consequences.  Additionally, the 
reputation concerns elicited from a case that is completed individually via computer may 
differ from the concerns evoked in a natural setting, where managers interact with many 
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others, across many groups. Lastly, this study tests individuals’ compliance with 
disclosure regulations in stylized scenarios.  While the study does capture essential 
elements of the choice, it is undoubtedly less rich than the decision setting that individuals 
might actually face. 
Future research may extend my findings in several important ways.  First, future 
research may add to insights yielded from my supplemental analysis suggesting that 
sanction attributes such as fault are more effective at influencing the social perceptions 
and compliance of individuals who are high in ‘dark triad’ personality traits.  Future 
research may further investigate whether high triad individuals perceive costs differently 
than low triad individuals, for instance – by reacting less severely to small penalties; and, 
future research may further investigate whether high triads’ ethical framing is reacting 
more to ego threats evoked by the reputation stigma of the fault label, or to the threat of 
social consequences stemming from isolation and relationship loss.  Additionally, results 
in my managerial scenario include a minority of managers who choose ‘costly non-
compliance’ consistent with intentional ‘narrow misses’ compliance thresholds by 
incurring virtually all of the costs of compliance but deliberately falling short of the 
enforced threshold.  This behavior is interesting and important to understanding the full 
spectrum of compliance.  In particular, intentional ‘narrow misses’ appear to be probing 
the boundary of ethically defensible actions, while also attempting to extracting benefits 
from non-compliance.  It would be beneficial to better understand what structural and 
person factors contribute to and/or this probing behavior.  Copyright © Matt Sooy 2016	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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENT INSTRUMENT 
Panel A: Managerial Scenario 
 
Background   
In this scenario, you will assume the role of a plant manager who supervises a moderate-sized 
manufacturing plant.  Like other manufacturers in this industry, you are faced with the problem of 
dealing with a toxic gas (VS-1) that is created as a by-product of the manufacturing process.    
Environmentalists have become increasingly concerned about the problem and have proposed that 
all of your plant’s smokestacks be equipped with ‘scrubbers’ that would completely eliminate the 
toxic gas if they operated 100% of the time.    
The scrubbers are relatively expensive, which would reduce plant profit and – accordingly – both 
a) your division’s performance, relative to others and b) your performance-based bonus 
compensation.  The choice of if and how much to run the scrubbers is solely your responsibility.    
Regulatory Environment   
Environmentalists have recently threatened to lobby for increased legislation that would require 
manufacturers to purchase and run the scrubbers 100% of the time, and would additionally require 
manufacturers to comply with strict regulatory reporting requirements.  Running the scrubbers 
100% of the time would cost about $1.5M annually, and the costs of complying with additional 
regulatory oversight would be about $3.0M.    
With the potential threat of the environmentalists lobbying for increased legislation, all of the 
manufacturers in the industry have come together and reached an agreement in which all 
manufacturers would install scrubbers and run them 80% of the time.  This solution is acceptable 
to the environmentalists because it eliminates all of the major health and environmental safety 
concerns.  It is desirable from the manufacturers’ standpoint because it avoids increased legislation 
and the costs of associated compliance.    
If most (at least 80%) of the manufacturers in the industry comply with agreement, the 
environmentalists will be satisfied with the solution.  However, if fewer than 80% of the 
manufacturers in the industry comply with the agreement, then environmentalists will revive the 
increased legislation and you (and the other manufacturers) will be forced to incur compliance 
costs.    
[MANAGER WEAK FAULT]  Enforcement of the agreement is limited because regulators have 
limited resources.  Regulators conduct random checks of about 5% of manufacturing plants each 
year.  Regulators open investigations of plant managers (e.g. you) they suspect of 
violations.  Investigated plant managers may ultimately be proven innocent, but most investigated 
managers choose to settle cases - to avoid a long and costly legal defense.  Settlements entail a 
small fine of around $50,000 payable by the manager, who must also admit fault in the 
matter.  Settlements do not carry criminal consequences.  Investigations and their outcomes 
(including settlements) are recorded in a publicly accessible database. 
[FIRM STRONG NO-FAULT] Enforcement of the agreement is strong because regulators have 
many resources.  Regulators conduct random checks of about 80% of manufacturing plants each 
year.  Regulators open investigations of firms they suspect of violations.  Investigated firms may 
ultimately be proven innocent, but most investigated firms choose to settle cases - to avoid a long 
and costly legal defense.  Settlements entail a large fine of around $2,000,000 payable by the firm, 
which neither admits nor denies fault in the matter.  Settlements do not carry criminal 
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consequences.  Investigations and their outcomes (including settlements) are recorded in a publicly 
accessible database. 
 
Knowledge Check 1 of 8: What is your role in the case? 
m Dropdown options: Plant Manager, Regulator, Unclear or not stated in the case 
 
Knowledge Check 2 of 8:  What % of the time must your plant run its pollution control equipment 
('scrubbers') to fully eliminate the toxic gas (VS-1) it generates in the manufacturing process? 
m Dropdown options: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%, Unclear or not stated in case 
 
Knowledge Check 3 of 8:  How much would it cost your plant to run the pollution control 
scrubbers 100% of the time? 
m Dropdown options: $0, $50,000, $500,000, $1,000,000, $1,500,000, $2,000,000, $2,500,000, 
$3,000,000, Unclear or not stated in case 
 
Knowledge Check 4 of 8:  What % of manufacturers must comply with the agreement to avoid 
increased legislation? 
m Dropdown options: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%, Unclear or not stated in the case 
 
Knowledge Check 5 of 8: What % of manufacturing plants do regulators randomly check each 
year? 
m Dropdown options: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%+ 
 
Knowledge Check 6 of 8: If you accepted a settlement with regulators, what is the fine associated 
with the settlement? 
m Dropdown options: $0 (No Fine), $50,000, $250,000, $500,000, $1,000,000, $1,500,000, 
$2,000,000, $2,500,000, $3,000,000 
 
Knowledge Check 7 of 8: If you accepted a settlement with regulators, who would pay the 
settlement fine? 
m Dropdown options: You (the manager), Your firm, Unknown or not stated in the case 
 
Knowledge Check 8 of 8: If you accepted a settlement with regulators, would you be required to 
admit fault in the matter? 
m Dropdown options: Yes, No, Unclear or not stated in the case 
 
Case - (continued)    
You are trying to decide how much you should run the pollution control scrubbers.  You estimate 
that:    The scrubbers cost $0.3M for every increment of 20% of the time that they are run ($0.3M 
for 20%, $0.6M for 40%, $0.9M for 60%, etc.  (See table below).    
Other manufacturers are also making the same choice – they are choosing what percentage of total 
time that they should operate their own scrubbers.    
As noted previously, your perception is that if most of the other manufacturers in your industry 
abide by the agreement then you do not expect increased legislation or increased compliance costs 
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($3.0M per year); but if most other manufacturers do not abide by the agreement, then you do 
expect increased legislation.    
 
TABLE: Pollution Control Scrubber Costs 
 
 
Please indicate what choices you would make as plant manager:  
Slider bar: What percent (%) of the time would you operate the pollution control scrubbers?  (0% / 
$0 vs. 100% / $1.5M) 
 
In a few sentences, explain the basis for your pollution control scrubber decision (why did you 
make the decision that you did)? (Text Input) 
 
Your decision in the scenario is best described as: 
m Dropdown options (random ordering): A Personal Decision, An Ethical Decision, A Business 
Decision, An Environmental Decision, A Legal Decision 
 
What % of other plant managers would operate the scrubbers at least 80% of the time? 
m Dropdown options: 0% (all other managers would violate the agreement), 5%, 10%, 15%, 
20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%, 
100% (all other managers would comply with the agreement) 
 
How much environmental damage will be caused if the scrubbers were operated less than 80% of 
the time? 
m Dropdown options: None, A little, A moderate amount, A large amount, Do not know, Does 
not matter 
 
Slider bar: What is the plant manager's responsibility? (to run the plant profitability vs. to protect 
the environment) 
 
Please allocate 100 points among the following 11 factors based on how important different 
factors were in your case choice.  Please allocate points based on the factors you actually 
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considered in your decision-making. (Note: to facilitate ease of use, respondents not constrained to 
100 points) 
Slider Options, randomly ordered: Probability of being caught, Magnitude of fines, Your plant's 
profit, The possibility that other manufacturers might/might not comply, What was 'the right thing 
to do', What complied with the law, What others might think (family, friends, colleagues, etc), My 
regret for harming others, Possibility of being sued if caught, Possibility that my career may be 
damaged, Possibility of getting fired 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. (7pt Likert – Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree) 
Considering all of the possible risks and costs – the potential downside of violating pollution 
control regulations is high for you (the plant manager).  
Considering all of the possible risks and costs – the potential downside of violating pollution 
control regulations is high for your firm.  
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. (7pt Likert – Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree) 
From your standpoint (the plant manager):  If an investigation was launched and a settlement 
reached - the fine associated with accepting the settlement could damage your personal finances. 
From your standpoint (the plant manager):  If an investigation was launched and a settlement 
reached - your reputation and relationships would be damaged.  
From your standpoint (the plant manager):  If an investigation was launched and a settlement 
reached - you would think less of yourself. 
From the standpoint of the firm:  If an investigation was launched and a settlement reached - the 
fine associated with accepting the settlement could damage the firm's finances.  
From the standpoint of the firm:  If an investigation was launched and a settlement reached - the 
firm's reputation and relationships would be damaged.  
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. (7pt Likert – Strongly Disagree / Strongly Agree) 
The likelihood of being caught violating environmental regulations is high 
The consequences of violating environmental regulations are not my problem 
The consequences of accepting a settlement are not my problem  
If I accepted a settlement, people would think that I was guilty 
Have you completed a similar case/survey by the same requester in the past week? 
m Dropdown options: Yes, No 
Was anything unclear or missing from the case? (write below) 
Do you have any other thoughts about the case or this HIT? 
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The following questions are to confirm your retention of case facts.  Please attempt to recall the 
case facts as much as possible. Your survey will not be held up or cancelled by incorrect answers.  
 
Retention Check 1: What is your role in the case? 
m Dropdown options: Plant Manager, Regulator, Unclear or not stated in the case 
 
Retention Check 2:  What % of the time must your plant run its pollution control equipment 
('scrubbers') to fully eliminate the toxic gas (VS-1) it generates in the manufacturing process? 
m Dropdown options: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%, Unclear or not stated in case 
 
Retention Check 3:  What % of manufacturers must comply with the agreement to avoid increased 
legislation? 
m Dropdown options: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%, Unclear or not stated in the case 
 
Retention Check 4: What % of manufacturing plants do regulators randomly check each year? 
m Dropdown options: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%+ 
 
Retention Check 5: Which is greater - the settlement fine or the cost of running the scrubbers at 
least 80% of the time? 
m Dropdown options: The settlement fine is greater, The cost of running the scrubbers is 
greater, The costs are equal, Unclear or not stated in the case 
 
Retention Check 6: If you/your firm accepted a settlement with regulators, who would pay the 
settlement fine? 
m Dropdown options: You (the manager), Your firm, Unknown or not stated in the case 
 
Retention Check 7: If you/your firm accepted a settlement with regulators, would you be required 
to admit fault in the matter? 
m Dropdown options: Yes, No, Unclear or not stated in the case 
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Panel B: Financial Case 
Background  
In this scenario, you will assume the role of an underwriting manager in a financial services 
firm.  Your group underwrites stock sales such as IPOs ('Initial Public Offerings') – when 
companies wish to issue stocks or bonds, they come to your group.  Your group facilitates the 
issuance by finding investors for the IPO shares.   
As compensation for underwriting an IPO, your group typically receives cash or stock that is 
increasing in the price that the IPO realizes – the higher the share price you achieve for your 
clients, the greater the revenue that your group receives.  As group manager, you receive a salary 
and a profit-sharing bonus that depends on your group’s performance.  Thus, both your group’s 
profit and your bonus depend on your ability to achieve higher IPO share prices for the securities 
that your group underwrites.  
The Investment Prospectus 
In a typical IPO, the underwriter (e.g. you) hires outside consultants to generate performance 
projections.  The outside consultants compute performance projections based on the company’s 
past performance.  An important part of your job is to compile this information into a prospectus – 
an investment report – that investors will rely on when deciding what price they are willing to pay 
per IPO share.  And, you must identify investors who may be interested in the IPO (e.g. by sector, 
industry, region or other profile).  Creating and updating the prospectus is the 
underwriter’s sole responsibility. 
Generally speaking, higher performance forecasts result in higher IPO share prices.  
Regulations 
There is a time lag of around 3 months between when the consultants complete their performance 
projections and when the IPO is first made available for sale. In some situations, circumstances 
may change at either the IPO firm and/or in the economy that leads the performance projections in 
the investment prospectus to become inaccurate / unreliable.   
Because investors rely on these performance projections, regulations require that 
the investment prospectus be updated whenever the underwriter becomes aware that economic 
circumstances have changed.   Because the investment prospectus is the underwriter’s sole 
responsibility (no one else will update or is expected to update the information), updating the 
prospectus is solely the underwriter’s responsibility.   
Failing to update new circumstances / performance projections is considered ‘misrepresentation’ 
by regulators, a violation of securities regulations.  This is because – without updating the 
projections – the investment prospectus (which investors use to decide on an appropriate price) 
forecasts higher performance than the underwriter knows to be true.  When this happens, investors 
will experience losses  when the share price eventually drops to its true value. Collectively, 
investor losses can easily total in the millions of dollars, or more.  
Updated performance projections typically take one of two forms:  either a ‘full update’ – which 
meets both the legal requirements and the intent of the regulations. Or, a ‘minimal update’– which 
meets only the legal requirements outlined in the regulation, but is intentionally designed to be 
difficult for investors to fully comprehend (e.g. using fine print, ‘legalese’, etc.).  With full 
updates, most investors appear to understand the updated information, leading the IPO price to 
fully reflect the new information.  This lowers bonus compensation. Typically, many investors 
have trouble processing minimal updates, leading the IPO price to change in the expected 
direction, but in a smaller amount (it will not fully reflect the true information).    
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[MANAGER WEAK FAULT] Enforcement of misrepresentation cases is limited because 
regulators have limited resources and cases of misrepresentation are difficult to prove.  Regulators 
must prove that the underwriter (e.g. you) possessed, but did not update ‘material new 
information.’ Consequently, about 5% of IPO investment prospectuses are investigated. 
Regulators open investigations of underwriting managers they suspect of misrepresentation 
violations.  Investigated underwriting managers may ultimately be proven innocent, but most 
investigated managers choose to settle cases - to avoid a long and costly legal 
defense.  Settlements entail a fine of around $25,000 payable by the manager, who must also admit 
fault in the matter.  Settlements do not carry criminal consequences.  Investigations an their 
outcomes (including settlements) are recorded in a publicly accessible database. 
[FIRM STRONG NO-FAULT] Enforcement of misrepresentation cases is strong because 
regulators have committed resources to identifying cases of misrepresentation.  Regulators must 
prove that the underwriter (e.g. you) possessed, but did not update ‘material new information.’ 
Consequently, at least 50% of IPO investment prospectuses are investigated. Regulators open 
investigations of underwriting firms they suspect of misrepresentation violations.  Investigated 
underwriting firms may ultimately be proven innocent, but most investigated firms choose to settle 
cases - to avoid a long and costly legal defense.  Settlements entail a fine of around $2,000,000 
payable by the firm, which neither admits nor denies fault in the matter.  Settlements do not carry 
criminal consequences.  Investigations an their outcomes (including settlements) are recorded in a 
publicly accessible database. 
Knowledge Check 1 of 8: What is your role in the case? 
m Dropdown options: Underwriting Manager, Investor, Regulator, CEO of an IPO Firm, 
Unclear or not stated in the case 
Knowledge Check 2 of 8:  When new information about the IPO firm or the economy become 
available to underwriter, who should update the investment prospectus (to ensure that the 
prospectus accurately reflects performance projections). 
m Underwriting Manager, Investors, Regulators, Unclear or not stated in case 
Knowledge Check 3 of 8:  Who is ultimately harmed when an IPO prospectus overstates the 
performance projections of the IPO firm? 
m Underwriters, Investors, Regulators, Unclear or not stated in case 
Knowledge Check 4 of 8:  Updating the prospectus with new unfavorable information will cause 
the following changes: 
Increase No Change Decrease 
IPO Share Price m m m [X] 
Underwriter's Profit & 
Bonus Pay m m m [X] 
Investor Losses m m m [X] 
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Knowledge Check 5 of 8: What % of IPO investment prospectuses do regulators check? 
m Dropdown options: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%+ 
 
Knowledge Check 6 of 8: If you accepted a settlement with regulators, what is the fine associated 
with the settlement? 
m Dropdown options: $0 (No Fine), $25,000, $50,000, $250,000, $500,000, $1,000,000, 
$1,500,000, $2,000,000, $2,500,000 
 
Knowledge Check 7 of 8: If you accepted a settlement with regulators, who would pay the 
settlement fine? 
m Dropdown options: You (the underwriting manager), Your firm, Unknown or not stated in the 
case 
 
Knowledge Check 8 of 8: If you accepted a settlement with regulators, would you be required to 
admit fault in the matter? 
m Dropdown options: Yes, No, Unclear or not stated in the case 
 
 
Current Issue      
Your group has been engaged to underwrite a securities issue for Digifacture – a moderate-sized 
high-tech manufacturing firm.  As part of the underwriting agreement, your group will receive a 
small fee, and will receive substantial performance-based revenue if the selling price of 
Digifacture’s stock offering exceeds $15 per share.      
Based on Digifacture’s audited past performance, reputable financial consultants have 
independently generated performance projections that value each share at $20. At that price, your 
bonus compensation tied to the deal would be substantial – approximately $50,000 from this deal 
alone.      
However, you have recently become aware of changing economic conditions in the industry that 
have not yet been publicly reported (a public report will be made about one week after the stock 
offering). Based on your personal knowledge, you believe that Digifacture’s performance 
projections should now be revised down, to $15 per share. You have verified the information 
through other sources and you are confident that it is true and complete.      
You are trying to decide if and/or how you should disclose the updated information.  You 
estimate that:       
FULL UPDATE: If you make a full update, you will achieve an average selling price of $15.00 
per share (corresponding to a $0 bonus for you).  Because your update complies with regulations, 
you will face no additional legal or regulatory risks. Because your update fully communicates your 
private information, Digifacture investors will not suffer predictable losses - the issue price will 
equal its fundamental value.      
MINIMAL UPDATE: If you make a minimal update, you will achieve an average selling price of 
$17.50 per share (corresponding to a $25,000 bonus for you).  Because your update complies with 
regulations, you will face no additional legal or regulatory risks.  Because many Digifacture 
investors will have trouble understanding the disclosed information, many are likely to pay more 
for the stock than it is actually worth.  You predict that they will be surprised when the price 
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declines to $15.00 per share (expected to occur 7 days later, when the government releases 
economic results).      
NO UPDATE:  If you make no update, you will achieve an average selling price of $20.00 per 
share (corresponding to a $50,000 bonus for you).  This choice does not comply with regulations.  
And, if prosecuted, you would face a fine ($25,000) and would not be required to admit or be 
permitted to deny fault.  The majority of fines (95%) are settled in this manner. Because you have 
not disclosed the economic information, Digifacture investors are likely to pay more than the stock 
is actually worth. You predict that they will be surprised when the price declines to $15.00 per 
share (expected to occur 7 days later, when the government releases economic results). 
TABLE: Updating Options 
 
 
 
Please indicate what choice you would make as underwriting manager 
m Dropdown options: I would make NO UPDATE to the investment prospectus, I would 
MINIMALLY UPDATE the investment prospectus, I would FULLY UPDATE the investment 
prospectus 
 
Acknowledging that decisions like this (updating investment prospectus) are seldom black and 
white, if you could choose exactly how much you update the prospectus, what amount of updating 
would you choose?  (use the slider to adjust the level of updating) 
Slider bar What amount of updating would you choose? (Minimal Update vs. Full Update) 
 
In a few sentences, explain the basis for your prospectus updating decision (why did you make the 
decision that you did)? 
 
This choice in the scenario is best described as: 
m Dropdown options (ordered randomly): A Personal Decision, An Ethical Decision, A 
Business Decision, An Environmental Decision, A Legal Decision 
 
 
How much harm will investors experience if the prospectus is not updated? 
m Dropdown options: None, A little, A moderate amount, A large amount, Do not know, Does 
not matter 
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What is the underwriting manager's responsibility? 
Slider bar: The underwriting manager's responsibility is... (to run the group profitably vs. to 
protect investors from harm) 
Please allocate points among the following 10 factors based on how important different factors 
were in your case choice.  Please allocate points based on the factors you actually considered in 
your decision-making. (Note: to facilitate ease of use, respondents not constrained to 100 points) 
Options, ordered randomly: Probability of being caught, Magnitude of fines, Your group's profit, 
What was 'the right thing to do', What complied with the law, What others might think (family, 
friends, colleagues, etc), My regret for harming others, Possibility of being sued if caught, 
Possibility that my career may be damaged, Possibility of getting fired 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. 7pt Likert (Strongly Disagree, Strongly Agree) 
Considering all of the possible risks and costs – the potential downside of violating 
misrepresentation regulations is high for you (the underwriting manager). 
Considering all of the possible risks and costs – the potential downside of violating 
misrepresentation regulations is high for your firm. 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. 7pt Likert (Strongly Disagree, Strongly Agree) 
From your standpoint (the underwriting manager):  If an investigation was launched and a 
settlement reached - the fine associated with accepting the settlement could damage your personal 
finances. 
From your standpoint (the underwriting manager):  If an investigation was launched and a 
settlement reached - your reputation and relationships would be damaged. 
From your standpoint (the underwriting manager):  If an investigation was launched and a 
settlement reached - you would think less of yourself. 
From the standpoint of the firm:  If an investigation was launched and a settlement reached - the 
fine associated with accepting the settlement could damage the firm's finances. 
From the standpoint of the firm:  If an investigation was launched and a settlement reached - the 
firm's reputation and relationships would be damaged.  
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. 7pt Likert (Strongly Disagree, Strongly Agree) 
The likelihood of being caught violating misrepresentation regulations is high 
The consequences of misrepresentation regulations are not my problem  
The consequences of accepting a settlement are not my problem 
If I accepted a settlement, people would think that I was guilty 
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Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. 7pt Likert (Strongly Disagree, Strongly Agree) 
The case was realistic  
The case was easy to understand 
I would recommend this HIT to others 
The following questions are to confirm your retention of case facts.  Please attempt to recall the 
case facts as much as possible. Your survey will not be held up or cancelled by incorrect answers. 
Retention Check 1: What is your role in the case? 
m Dropdown options: Underwriting Manager, Investor, Regulator, CEO of an IPO Firm, 
Unclear or not stated in the case 
Retention Check 2:  When new information about the IPO firm or the economy become available 
to underwriter, who should update the investment prospectus (to ensure that the prospectus 
accurately reflects performance projections). 
m Dropdown options: Underwriting Manager, Investors, Regulators, Unclear or not stated in 
case 
Retention Check 3:  Who is ultimately harmed when an IPO prospectus overstates the performance 
projections of the IPO firm? 
m Dropdown options: Underwriters, Investors, Regulators, Unclear or not stated in case 
Retention Check 4: What % of IPO investment prospectuses do regulators check? 
m Dropdown options: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%+ 
Retention Check 5: Which is greater - the bonus you would earn from the IPO or the fine you 
would face for violating misrepresentation regulations?  
m Dropdown options: The potential fine is greater, The potential bonus is greater, The 
potential fine and bonus are equal, Unclear or not stated 
Retention Check 6: If you/your firm accepted a settlement with regulators, who would pay the 
settlement fine? 
m Dropdown options: You (the underwriting manager), Your firm, Unknown or not stated in 
the case 
Retention Check 7: If you/your firm accepted a settlement with regulators, would you/your firm be 
required to admit fault in the matter? 
m Dropdown options: Yes, No, Unclear or not stated in the case 
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Panel C: Exit Questions 
 
Demographic Questions 
 
What is your gender: 
m Dropdown options: Male, Female 
 
What year were you born? 
m Dropdown options: 1920 - 2000 
 
In which country do you reside? 
m Dropdown options:  All countries listed.  
 
Are you a parent? 
m Dropdown options: Yes, No 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
m Dropdown option: Less than High School, High School / GED, Some College, 2-year College 
Degree, 4-year College Degree, Masters Degree, Doctoral Degree, Professional Degree (JD, 
MD) 
 
How many college-level courses in business (accounting, finance, marketing, management, 
etc.)  have you completed? 
 
How many years of full-time work experience have you completed? 
 
In what industry(s) is your full-time work expense? 
 
Have you ever acted as a supervisor or manager for other employees? 
m Dropdown options: Yes, No  	  
General Questions (Set 1 of 4) 
For each question, please select 'True' if the statement accurately describes you; please select 
'False' if the statement does not accurately describe you. True / False 
I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people   
At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like  
I can only argue for ideas which I already believe  
I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others  
I would probably make a good actor  
In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention  
In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons 
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I am not particularly good at making other people like me  
I'm not always the person I appear to be  
I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their 
favor  
I have considered being an entertainer  
I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting   
I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations  
At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going  
I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should   
I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a good reason)  
I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them  	   	  
General Questions (Set 2 of 4) 
For each question, please select 'True' if the statement accurately describes you; please select 
'False' if the statement does not accurately describe you. True/False 
I have a natural talent for influencing people  
Modesty doesn't suit me  
I would do almost anything on a dare  
I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so  
If I ruled the world it would be a much better place  
I can usually talk my way out of anything  
I like to be the center of attention  
I will be a success  
I think I am a special person  
I see myself as a good leader  
I am assertive  
I like to have authority over other people   
I find it easy to manipulate people   
I insist on getting the respect that I am due  
I like to show off my body   
I can read people like a book   
I like to take responsibility for making decisions  
I want to amount to something in the world  
I am likely to show off if I get the chance  
I always know what I am doing   
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For each question, please select 'True' if the statement accurately describes you; please select 
'False' if the statement does not accurately describe you.  True/False 
Please select 'True'  (option not bolded in actual instrument) 
I rarely depend on anyone else to get things done 
Everybody likes to hear my stories  
I expect a great deal from other people  
I won't be satisfied until I get all that I deserve   
I like to be complimented 
I have a strong will to power   
I like to start new trends and fashions  
I like to look at myself in the mirror 
I really like to be the center of attention   
I can live my life in any way I want to  
People always seem to recognize my authority  
I would prefer to be a leader  
I am going to be a great person   
I can make anybody believe anything I want them to  
I am a born leader  
I wish somebody would someday write my biography   
I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public  
I am more capable than other people   
I am an extra ordinary person  
I like to look at my body 
General Questions (Set 3 of 4) 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. 7pt Likert (Strongly Disagree, Strongly Agree) 
Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so  
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear  
One should take action only when they are sure it is morally right  
Most people are basically good and kind  
Please select 'Agree'  (option not bolded in actual instrument) 
Honestly is the best policy in all cases  
There is no excuse for lying to someone else  
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It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there 
All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest 
When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for wanting it 
rather than giving reasons that carry more weight 
Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives	  
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. 7pt Likert (Strongly Disagree, Strongly Agree) 
Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble ( 
The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough 
to get caught   
Most people are brave  
It is wise to flatter important people 
It is possible to be good in all respects  
Barnum was very wrong when he said that there's a sucker burn every minute 
Generally speaking, people won't work hard unless they're forced to 
People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being painlessly put to death 
People more easily forget the death of a parent than the loss of their property 
It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given 
a chance 
General Questions (Set 4 of 4) 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements by selecting the option that 
most closely corresponds to your beliefs. 7pt Likert (Strongly Disagree, Strongly Agree) 
I don't think of myself as tricky or sly  
I get a kick out of 'conning' someone 
I got in a lot of trouble at school  
I enjoy gambling for large stakes  
It's sometimes fun to see how far you can push someone before they catch on  
I can be fairly cunning if I have to be  
I think of myself as self-assured and confident  
I usually feel quite confident when meeting new people  
I would NOT describe myself as shy or timid  
I wish I were more assertive  
I often worry unnecessarily  
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Please select 'Disagree’ (option not bolded in actual instrument) 
I worry a lot about possible misfortunes  
I didn't get into much trouble in school  
I am very good at most things I try to do  
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